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ARTICLES
LIMIT DEDUCTIONS FOR MIXED PERSONAL/
BUSINESS EXPENSES: CURB CURRENT




Often, when one thinks of tax abuses apart from tax shelters, one focuses
on mixed personal/business deductions. "When [such] expenses are de-
ducted, the government effectively pays part of the cost of personal con-
sumption that others must purchase with after-tax dollars."1
While business deductions can be justified by their generation of taxable
income, purely personal deductions cannot. Essentially, personal deductions
reduce the tax base,2 undermine an "ability to pay" tax policy, 3 and add to
* Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law. B.A., Clark University,
1968; M.A., Assumption College, 1971; J.D., University of Akron School of Law, 1976; LL.M
(Taxation), National Law Center, George Washington University, 1979. I would like to thank
the following professors for reviewing my article and injecting their insightful comments: John
Lynch, Jr., Richard Parker and Walter Schwidetzky. I would also like to thank Professor
Robert Lande for his advice and Ms. Donna Pennepacker for her secretarial assistance.
1. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, 1 TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND
ECONOMIC GROWTH 84 (1984) [hereinafter 1984 TREASURY PLAN].
2. See id. at 77. The Treasury Department proposed curtailing or eliminating deduc-
tions for certain state and local taxes and for charitable gifts. Id. at 77-83.
3. That is, only the wealthy itemize and take advantage of these deductions; moreover,
those with the greatest incomes (i.e., those in the highest tax brackets) benefit disproportion-
ately. See STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM 255-56 (1973). To counter such
a result, the Treasury Department has concluded that "[fthe only way to achieve equal treat-
ment of equals is to define the tax base comprehensively. If some items of income are omitted
from the tax base, or if particular expenditures are treated preferentially, then taxpayers who
are otherwise in equal positions will not be treated equally." 1 1984 TREASURY PLAN, supra
note 1, at 14; see also Mark G. Kelman, Personal Deductions Revisited: Why They Fit Poorly in
an "Ideal" Income Tax and Why They Fit Worse in a Far from Ideal World, 31 STAN. L. REV.
831 (1979). In fact, in order to maintain an integrity with a taxpayer's ability to pay, Congress
has imposed adjusted gross income (AGI) floors on personal deductions, such as medical ex-
penses and casualty losses, to insure that these deductions apply only to extraordinary ex-
penses. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 113 (1982) [hereinafter 1982 S. REP.]
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the complexity of the tax system.4 Because their function is questionable, 5
personal deductions are often targeted for elimination6 or reduction7 when-
ever tax reform is made. By recently placing a floor on the deductibility of
personal expenses for higher income taxpayers,' while also phasing out and
("Further, many of the losses which are small relative to income do not significantly reduce
ability to pay taxes, especially since they could have been avoided by the purchase of insur-
ance."); S. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 59 (1986) [hereinafter 1986 S. REP.] ("Thus, the
bill retains deductibility where the expenses for a year are so great that they absorb a substan-
tial portion of the taxpayer's income and hence substantially affect the taxpayer's ability to pay
taxes.").
4. See, e.g., 1982 S. REP., supra note 3, at 113, 115; 1986 S. REP., supra note 3, at 56, 59;
see also 1 1984 TREASURY PLAN, supra note 1, at 77, 83; 2 1984 TREASURY PLAN, supra note
1, at 116.
5. Some scholars maintain that certain personal deductions should be retained. For ex-
ample, a case has been made for the charitable contribution deduction on such theories as a
business deduction, a discharge of a moral obligation, a substitute for unpaid services, and as a
reward for praiseworthy behavior. See Boris I. Bittker, Charitable Contributions: Tax Deduc-
tions or Matching Grants?, 28 TAX L. REV. 37, 56-60 (1972). Additionally, deductions for
certain state and local taxes are recognized as having enabled the smaller governing authorities
to raise needed revenues to benefit all income levels. If this deduction is repealed, it may
aggravate inequities between taxpayers by overstating the taxable income of many taxpayers.
See Brookes D. Billman, Jr. & Noel B. Cunningham, Nonbusiness State and Local Taxes: The
Case for Deductibility, 85 TAX NOTES TODAY 174-96 (Sept. 3, 1985). Contra Bruce Bartlett,
The Case for Eliminating Deductibility of State and Local Taxes, 85 TAx NOTES TODAY 174-
97 (Sept. 3, 1985). State and local income taxes are deductible in some consumption-based tax
models when they are viewed as non-consumption items. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREAS-
URY, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIc TAX REFORM 117 (1977). Certain personal deductions have
been justified on policy and income definition grounds. See, e.g., William D. Andrews, Per-
sonal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REV. 309, 314-15 (1972) (arguing that
medical services and charitable contributions should be excluded from the calculation of an
individual's personal consumption for tax purposes). A thorough examination of this issue is
beyond the scope of this Article.
6. For example, the Revenue Act of 1978 removed the personal itemized deduction for
gasoline taxes. See Pub. L. No. 95-600, sec. 111(b), 92 Stat. 2767, 2777 (1978) (amending
I.R.C. § 164(b)(5)). Likewise, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 eliminated the deduction for all
personal (consumer) interest other than for qualified residence indebtedness, and made non-
business related sales taxes nondeductible. See Pub. L. No. 99-514, sec. 511, 100 Stat. 2085,
2244 (1986) (amending I.R.C. § 163(d) and adding § 163(h)). The statute allowed a five-year
phase-in of the disallowance so that its full impact actually began in 1991. See I.R.C.
§ 163(d)(6), (h)(6) (1988). For repeal of the sales tax deduction, see sec. 134(a), 100 Stat. at
2116 (repealing I.R.C. § 164(a)(4)).
7. For example, the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-
248, 96 Stat. 324, raised the floors for both medical expenses, see sec. 202, 96 Stat. at 421
(amending I.R.C. § 213, increasing the threshold from 3 to 5% of AGI and casualty losses),
see sec. 203, 96 Stat. at 422 (amending I.R.C. § 165(c)(3) and adding § 165(h), allowing this
deduction only to the extent that the loss exceeds 10% of the taxpayer's AGI). The Tax
Reform Act of 1986 further increased the floor for medical expenses to 7.5%, see sec. 113, 100
Stat. at 2116, and imposed a floor on miscellaneous itemized deductions, see sec. 132(a), 100
Stat. at 2115 (adding new I.R.C. § 67).
8. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, sec. 11103,
104 Stat. 1388-400, 1388-406 (adding I.R.C. § 68 for year 1991 and beyond). Under this
provision, where a taxpayer's AGI exceeds the applicable amount (i.e., $100,000, or $50,000
[Vol. 41:581
Tax Code
eliminating personal exemptions for those individuals, 9 Congress has found a
means to reimpose some progressivity into the tax system,' 0 which the Tax
for marrieds filing separately), itemized deductions, including charitable deductions, hobby
loss expenses, miscellaneous itemized deductions, taxes, interest other than investment interest
but not including medical deductions and/or casualty and theft losses (these are already sub-
ject to income floors), and wagering losses are reduced by the lower of either: "(1) 3 percent of
the excess of adjusted gross income over the applicable amount, or (2) 80 percent of the
amount of the itemized deductions otherwise allowable for such taxable year." Id. To illus-
trate, if a taxpayer's AGI is $250,000 and he has $70,000 of personal itemized deductions
subject to this provision, he would have to reduce his total itemized deductions by $4,500 (i.e.,
3% x ($250,000 - $100,000), because 80% of $70,000 is $56,000). See Joint Comm. on
Tax'n, Description of Proposed Amendments to the Revenue Provisions of the Budget Summit
Agreement (JCX-28-90), 45-46 (Oct. 10, 1990) [hereinafter 1990 Joint Comm., Description];
see also H.R. REP. 37, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 361 (1990) [hereinafter 1990 CONF. REP.]. This
provision is set to expire in 1996. But see Technical Explanation of "Revenue Act of 1992"
(HR 11), As Approved July 29, 1992, By Senate Finance Committee, Daily Rep. for Executive
(BNA) Special Supp. Rep. No. 152, at S-29 (Aug. 6, 1992) [hereinafter 1992 Explanation]
(proposing to extend permanently the current § 68 itemized deduction limitation applicable to
higher-income taxpayers).
Furthermore, this provision is indexed for inflation, sec. 11103, 104 Stat. at 1388-406, and is
expected to raise $548,000,000 for 1991 and $3,714,000,000 for 1992. Joint Comm. on Tax'n,
Budget Reconciliation (H.R. 5835) - Revenue Provisions as Reported by the Conferees (JCX-
45-90), 2 (Oct. 26, 1990) [hereinafter 1990 Revenue Provisions].
9. When a taxpayer's AGI exceeds the threshold amount (i.e., $150,000 for marrieds
filing jointly; $100,000 for singles), his exemption is reduced by 2% for each $2,500 (or part) of
this excess. Like I.R.C. § 68, this provision is scheduled to expire for tax years after 1995. See
sec. 11104, 104 Stat. at 1388-407 (amending I.R.C. § 151(d)); see also 1990 CONF. REP., supra
note 8, at 3-4. But see 1992 Explanation, supra note 8, at S-29 (proposing to extend the phase-
out of personal exemptions under I.R.C. § 151) ("The committee believes that the phaseout
[sic] of the deduction for personal exemptions claimed by higher income individuals is an
effective means of ensuring that the individual income tax system remains a sufficiently pro-
gressive means of raising revenue."). In 1991, a joint return filer with an AGI of $212,500
would receive half of the exemptions to which he was otherwise entitled. Id. at 4. This provi-
sion is indexed for inflation, sec. 11104, 104 Stat. at 1388-407, and is expected to raise
$1,046,000,000 in 1991 and $2,028,000,000 in 1992, see 1990 Revenue Provisions, supra note 8,
at 2.
10. Congress recognized that "[tihe degree of progressivity of the Federal tax system ap-
pears to have declined in the last 10 to 15 years." STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 102ND
CONGRESS, 1ST SESS., TAX POLICY AND THE MACROECONOMY: STABILIZATION, GROWTH,
AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION 5 (Jt. Comm. Print 1991). It felt that
The higher an individual's AGI, the less likely it is that an otherwise deductible
expense will significantly affect the individual's ability to pay income taxes. Thus, ....
the goal of personalizing the Federal income tax based on each individual's ability to
pay taxes is enhanced by adoption of a rule that imposes some limitation on the
deductibility of amounts paid ....
1990 CONF. REP., supra note 8, at 361.
Similarly, the 1990 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act imposes a luxury tax aimed at
higher income bracket consumers. Sec. 11221, 104 Stat. at 1388-438 to -442 (adding I.R.C.
§§ 4001-4004). The luxury tax is equal to 10% of the cost of an automobile over $30,000, of a
boat over $100,000, of an aircraft over $250,000, of furs and jewelry over $10,000. Id. Con-
gress has thus found that it must create progressivity by such indirect means, because the
public generally resists raising taxes, even when it would not actually affect all taxpayers' tax
1992]
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Reform Act of 1986 had removed through the elimination of many tax
brackets and the lowering of tax rates."
In light of the continued budget deficit,' 2 the public's continued resistance
to new taxes,' 3 the need to restore some progressivity into the tax system,' 4
and the perceived unfairness of many of the mixed personal/business deduc-
tions, 5 it is now time to re-evaluate this area in a general fashion. With the
aim of targeting abuses and increasing the Tax Code's progressivity, this
Article reviews the home office deduction, the deduction allowed for certain
travel between home and work, the moving expense deduction, the exclusion
for certain fringe benefits, the deductions for business meals and entertain-
ment, and the childcare credit. This Article sets forth several legislative pro-
posals to curtail these benefits, including the phase-out or elimination of
liability. See 136 CONG. REC. H13060-HI3061 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990) (statement of Rep.
Rostenkowski) [hereinafter 1990 Rostenkowski Statement]; see also infra note 13.
11. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, sec. 101(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2096
(amending I.R.C. § 1). Prior to the enactment of the 1986 Tax Act, there were fifteen tax
brackets, with a maximum tax rate of 50%. With the passage of the 1986 Act, there were only
two brackets, with the highest bracket being 28%. The 1990 Tax Act introduced a third
bracket of 31%. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, sec. 11101. Yet, there is still far
less progressivity than before. Critics have complained that the tax burden has shifted to the
middle class. See infra note 14; see also Joint Comm. on Tax'n, Summary of Proposals Relat-
ing to Middle Income Tax Relief and Economic Growth (JCX-32-91) (Dec. 6, 1991).
12. See, e.g., Robert D. Hershey, Jr., The Experts Talk, But Who Listens? N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 15, 1992, at D2 (describing Congress' concern over the budget deficit and its disinclination
to follow the advice of economic experts); Howard Gleckman, Grab-Bag Economics, Bus.
WK., Feb. 10, 1992, at 24 (predicting a budget deficit of $400 billion by the end of fiscal 1992);
Robert J. Samuelson, Fairy-Tale Tax Plans, WASH. POST, Mar. 4, 1992, at A23 (postulating
that Congress is purposely subverting economic recovery by proposing ill-conceived tax cuts at
a time of severe budgetary crisis).
13. People were angry at President Bush for breaking his promise: "Read my lips, no new
taxes." See, e.g., Walter v. Robinson. Loyalists in South Cool to Bush: Campaign '92, BOSTON
GLOBE, Mar. 2, 1992, at 1 (citing the appeal of candidate Patrick J. Buchanan as stemming
from his promise not to raise taxes); Richard Benedetto, Anti-Bush Votes Give Boost to
Buchanan, USA TODAY, Feb. 19, 1992, at 3A (describing Buchanan supporters as voters an-
gry at President Bush for breaking his pledge of no new taxes).
14. See Poor, Middle-Class Hit by Higher Tax Burden in 1980's, JEC, Senate Budget Re-
port Says, [1991] Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 47, at G-1 (March 11, 1991). According to a
report of the Joint Economic Committee and Senate Budget Committee, the Tax Code is less
progressive today than it was in 1980; specifically, the middle class tax rate is 4% above 1980
rates, while the upper class (i.e., the wealthiest 1%) pays effectively 9% less. Id. The report
concluded that during the 1980s the rich improved their financial status, while the poor be-
came increasingly impoverished. Id.
While this indirect approach to re-introduce progressivity into the tax system is perhaps not
the optimal or ideal way of making the tax system more equitable, because of the public's
resistance to increasing taxes, see supra note 12, it appears to be a more politically acceptable
method and it is a logical extension of Congress' recent treatment of personal deductions and
exemptions. See supra notes 8 and 9.
15. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 41:581
Tax Code
benefits for higher income taxpayers," while keeping in mind their individ-ual justifications and legislative purposes.
I. THE HOME OFFICE DEDUCTION
A. Legislative and Administrative Background
The home office deduction originally was allowed like any other standard
business deduction.17 Then, in 1962, the Internal Revenue Service (Service)
issued a ruling requiring that a taxpayer first establish that his home office
was a condition of his employment in order to claim the deduction.'" The
courts, however, continued to involve the same standards that applied to any
other business deduction.' 9 To be deductible, a taxpayer's business expense
merely had to be "ordinary and necessary." 2° Reacting to a Tax Court deci-
sion21 holding that expenses for a home office could be deducted if they were
"appropriate and helpful," Congress created a special disallowance section22
16. See infra part VII.
17. See, e.g., Best Universal Lock Co. v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 1 (1965) (stating that a
taxpayer's $300 per year deduction for the tax years of 1959-1961 under section 162 of the
1954 I.R.C. to be "undisputed" based upon the fact that the taxpayer, an inventor, used an
office in his home in connection with his trade); Peiss v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 78 (1963)
(holding that a physiology professor who conducted research and prepared articles in his home
was allowed to deduct a portion of his home office expenses as ordinary and necessary business
expenses under section 162 of the I.R.C. of 1954); Bien v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 49 (1953)
(finding that taxpayers who maintained a business office in their home were permitted to de-
duct $400 as opposed to the claimed $600, since they produced insufficient facts proving the
reasonableness of their claimed deduction).
18. Rev. Rul. 62-180, 1962-2 C.B. 52, 53.
19. See I.R.C. § 162 of the 1986 and 1954 Internal Revenue Codes, and its predecessor,
§ 23(a)(1) of the 1939 Internal Revenue Code.
20. See I.R.C. § 162. The expense also had to be incurred while carrying on a trade or
business and paid or incurred in the current tax year. Id. Under Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S.
111 (1933), "ordinary" means "not a capital expense" and "necessary" means "appropriate
and helpful." The latter requirement is a fairly easy one to satisfy.
21. Bodzin v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 820 (1973), rev'd, 509 F.2d 679 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975). In Bodzin, a government attorney who worked two or three
evenings a week in his study, wherein he also kept his stamp collection and some other non-
business activities, was allowed by the Tax Court to deduct the cost of his home office as an
ordinary and necessary business expense under section 62 of the 1954 I.R.C. However, in
reversing the Tax Court's opinion, the Fourth Circuit found the "appropriate and helpful"
standard set forth in Welch to be too subjective a criteria and denied the taxpayer's deduction
as being a nondeductible personal expense. See Bodzin v. Commissioner, 509 F.2d 679, 681
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975). Congress made it clear that it was reacting to this
specific decision in creating the new section. See H.R. REP. No. 658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 160
(1975) [hereinafter 1975 H.R. REP.]; S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. I, at 147
(1976) [hereinafter 1976 S. REP.]; JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE
TAX REFORM AcT OF 1976 139 (1976), reprinted in 1976-3 C.B. 1, 151 (hereinafter 1976
JOINT COMM. EXPLANATION].
22. I.R.C. § 280A was added by the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, sec.
601(a), 90 Stat. 1520, 1569 (1976).
1992]
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in the Tax Code that added further requirements for the deductibility of
these expenses. The new section required that the taxpayer use his home
office, exclusively and on a regular basis, either: (1) as his principal place of
business, (2) as a place where he meets or deals with patients, clients or
customers in the ordinary course of his business, or (3) in connection with
his business, where the office is a separate structure unattached to his home.
If the taxpayer is an employee, the exclusive use of the home office must be
for the convenience of his employer.23 Congress' reaction to this particular
case provided some consistency among the positions of the courts and the
Service in this area.24 Congress enacted these stricter rules in order to pre-
vent taxpayers from converting personal expenses into deductible business
expenses, 25 particularly where there were little or no additional expenses in-
curred by the taxpayer. 2' During subsequent years, Congress has amended
23. I.R.C. § 280A(c) (1988).
24. See 1975 H.R. REP., supra note 21, at 852; 1976 S. REP., supra note 21, at 147; 1976
JOINT COMM. EXPLANATION, supra note 21, at 139.
25. 1976 JoiNT COMM. EXPLANATION, supra note 21, at 151. The example consistently
given in the legislative history referencing this section is that of a professor who is given office
space at his school but uses his den to grade papers and prepare for his classes. Congress




this section in certain ways27 without changing its basic original require-
ments or purposes.28
27. See Tax Reduction and Simplification Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-30, sec. 306, 91
Stat. 126, 152-53 (1977) (amending I.R.C. § 280A(c)(4)). The Act created an exception to the
exclusive use requirement in order to ease its application to licensed home day care facilities.
See S. REP. No. 66, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 6-7 (1977), H.R. CONF. REP. No. 263, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 29 (1977).
The Black Lung Benefits Revenue Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-119, 95 Stat. 1635 (1981),
changed the language of this section to read "the principal place of business of any trade or
business of the taxpayer." Sec. 113(c), 95 Stat. at 1642. Originally, it read "the taxpayer's
principal place of business." Congress enacted this amendment to conform with the Tax
Court's interpretation of Curphey v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 766 (1980). In Curphey, the court
recognized that a taxpayer could have more than one trade or business and ruled, therefore,
that this section should be applied separately to each of the taxpayer's trades or businesses.
See JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, SUMMARY OF BLACK LUNG BENEFITS REVENUE ACT OF 1981
11 (1981) [hereinafter BLBRA SUMMARY].
The Subchapter S Revision Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-354, sec. 5(a)(26), 96 Stat. 1669,
1694, in its Technical and Conforming Amendments, merely changed the "small business cor-
porations" language to conform with that of the Subchapter S Corporations.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, sec. 143(b) (c), 100 Stat. 2085, which
added I.R.C. § 280A(b), (c)(5), (c)(6), tightened two abuses relating to two contemporary Tax
Court decisions: Feldman v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 1 (1985), aff'd, 791 F.2d 781 (9th Cir.
1986), and Scott v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 683 (1985). See H.R. REP. No. 426, 99th Cong.,
1st Sess., 133-134 (1985) [hereinafter 1985 H.R. REP.]; 1986 S. REP., supra note 3, at 81-82;
JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. 84, reprinted in 1986-3 C.B. (1987) [hereinafter 1986 JOINT COMM.
EXPLANATION]. The Act disallows a home office deduction where a taxpayer leases part of his
home to his employer and limits the deduction to a taxpayer's gross income from his business
activity as reduced by all other deductible expenses attributable to the activity, including those
allocable to the use of the unit itself. Thus, the deduction may not be used to create or expand
a loss. The Act allows for a carry-forward to future years where such excess losses may absorb
a succeeding year's income from the home office business activity. For example, if a taxpayer
has gross income of $1,000 from his business activity and has $1,500 of related expenses (e.g.,
rent and depreciation) and $1,000 of expenses which do not relate to the use of the home (e.g.,
expenses for secretaries and supplies), he is not entitled to a home office deduction since it
would create a loss. Under the Scott decision, he would have been able to deduct the $1,500
costs relating to the unit as well. In the above example, the taxpayer could carry over the
unused home office expenses of $1,500 to the next year to offset his home office income. See
1986 JOINT COMM. EXPLANATION, supra, at 84.
The 1986 Tax Act also placed a 2% floor on an employee's unreimbursed business expenses
which would include his home office deduction. See sec. 132(a), 100 Stat. at 2113-16 (adding
I.R.C. § 67). The 2% floor applies to an employee's home office deduction because it is not a
deduction used to compute AGI, see I.R.C. § 62 (1988 & Supp. 1990), and is not one of the
itemized deductions excepted under I.R.C. § 67(b) (1988).
Finally, the 1990 Act reduces the amount deductible for a higher income employee's home
office, because the home office deduction is one subject to the phase-out of itemized deductions
imposed by I.R.C. § 68 (Supp. 1990). See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub.
L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388-400.
28. The statute was enacted to prevent taxpayers from converting essentially personal
expenses into deductible business expenses, and to disallow a deduction where there are no
incremental costs. See 1986 S. REP., supra note 3, at 83. Further, the provision was "enacted
19921
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B. The Courts and the Principal Place of Business Exception
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 allowed a home office deduction for a tax-
payer's home office structurally within his home, but only where the office
was either a place wherein the taxpayer met or dealt with his clients or cus-
tomers, or was his principal place of business.29 Although there has been
some litigation over the first exception3° and over the "exclusive use" re-
quirement of the overall provision,31 most of the controversy with regard to
this section has centered around the meaning of a taxpayer's "principal place
of business. '"32
In a 1980 case, the Tax Court adopted the "focal point" test to determine
the location of a taxpayer's principal place of business.33 In that case, the
taxpayer operated a hot dog (and other food) stand but used her home for
cooking, freezer storage, and administrative tasks. Since it was the sales at
her stand that generated taxable income, the court reasoned that the location
of the stand was the "focal point" of her operation, and therefore was her
principal place of business. It adopted this test in light of the restrictive
purpose of the 1976 home office deduction legislation. 34 The Tax Court con-
tinued to apply the "focal point" test throughout the 1980s. 35
The Courts of Appeals for the Second and Seventh Circuits, however, ex-
pressly rejected the "focal point" test. The Second Circuit reversed two Tax
Court opinions,36 holding that a concert violinist's home, where he prac-
ticed, was his principal place of business rather than the Metropolitan Opera
House, where he performed, 37 and that a professor's study, where he pre-
pared classes and worked on his publications, was his principal place of busi-
to replace vague standards." 127 CONG. REC. S15480 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 1981) (statement of
Sen. Dole).
29. See supra notes 22-23. It is even more significant, perhaps, that when part of a tax-
payer's home is defined as a home office, he is entitled not only to deduct expenses related to
that home office, but also to deduct expenses relating to his commute to and from that home
office to his other business locations. See infra notes 41, 62 and accompanying text.
30. See, e.g., Green v. Commissioner, 707 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that "meeting
or dealing" requires the physical presence of the taxpayer, and that talking on the phone is
insufficient).
31. See, e.g., Hamacher v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 348 (1990) (stating that where taxpay-
ers use their home office for two different businesses, both uses must be exclusive in order to
qualify for the deduction).
32. See supra note 27 (discussing the change Congress made to this language in the Black
Lung Benefits Revenue Act of 1981). For a discussion of this controversy, see infra notes 33-
43.
33. Baie v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 105 (1980).
34. Id. at 109.
35. See Drucker v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 605, rev'd, 715 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1983); Weiss-
man v. Commissioner, 47 T.C.M. (CCH) 520 (1983), rev'd, 751 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1984).
36. See supra note 35.
37. Drucker v. Commissioner, 715 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1983).
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ness rather than his university classroom, where he delivered his lectures."a
Likewise, the Seventh Circuit criticized the Tax Court's test. The court ad-
monished that the "focal point" test merely emphasized the place where the
taxpayer's work was more visible, instead of the location where he accom-
plished more of his business. a9
Responding to these criticisms, the Tax Court decided to abandon its
"focal point" test in Soliman v. Commissioner,40 and adopted a facts and
circumstances approach in which many factors, such as the time spent by
the taxpayer in his home office, the business exigencies inherent in maintain-
ing a home office, the functions performed at the home office and the suita-
bility of the office for these duties, and the appropriateness of the
furnishings,4 1 would all be examined. The relative time a taxpayer spent in
38. Weissman v. Commissioner, 751 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1984).
39. See Meiers v. Commissioner, 782 F.2d 75 (7th Cir. 1986) (discussing a taxpayer who,
along with her husband, owned and operated a laundromat, worked one hour per day at the
laundromat and two hours per day at her home office, where she drafted work schedules and
did bookkeeping and other administrative work); see also Cadwallader v. Commissioner, 919
F.2d 1273 (7th Cir. 1990). The taxpayer in Cadwallader, a psychology professor, was denied a
deduction for his home office because his employer had given him two and one-half offices at
his university, but the court nevertheless rejected the "vagaries" of a "focal point" test.
Although Cadwallader was decided by the circuit court after the Tax Court's opinion in
Soliman v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 20 (1990), aff'd, 935 F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. granted,
112 S. Ct. 1472 (1992), the Seventh Circuit berated the Tax Court's new test as creating a
"laundry list." Cadwallader, 919 F.2d at 1275.
40. 94 T.C. 20 (1990) (finding that an anesthesiologist who worked at three hospitals in
the Washington, D.C. area, but who maintained a home office wherein he did his billing and
administrative work, had his principal place of business in his home), aff'd, 935 F.2d 52 (4th
Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 1472 (1992).
41. Id. at 28. Since the Soliman decision, this test has been applied by the Tax Court and
a home office deduction has been allowed in such cases as Kahaku v. Commissioner, 58
T.C.M. (CCH) 1247 (1990), which held that a guitarist who practiced at his in-laws' home and
received home office designation at that location could deduct all commuting expenses from
that office to his various performance locations, and Hoye v. Commissioner, T.C.M. (CCH)
1338 (1990), where a surgeon who had a cytology biopsy lab in his home was held to have a
home office for the separate business, since billing was done at his medical office outside his
home. The Soliman test was applied and home office deductions were disallowed in McDon-
ald v. Commissioner, 61 T.C.M. (CCH) 1876 (1991). There, a taxpayer-wife did bookkeeping
part-time at home for her husband's electronics repair business and worked Saturdays in the
shop; the court held that her home office was secondary and incidental to her business location
at the electronics shop. In Mathes v. Commissioner, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 704 (1990), a history
professor with a university-provided office was denied a home office deduction, and although
the office was not large enough to house his extensive research materials, the home office was
held not to be maintained for the convenience of his employer. Similarly, in Shore v. Commis-
sioner, 59 T.C.M. (CCH) 762 (1990), aff'd, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 26835 (6th Cir. 1991), the
Tax Court denied the taxpayer a home office deduction where his blueprints were stored in an
unfinished part of his basement when he failed to prove that the unfinished area was essential
to his business, that he actually spent substantial time there, and that he had no other location
available for this purpose. Finally, in Starrett v. Commissioner, 59 T.C.M. (CCH) 334 (1990),
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each of his offices was held to be relevant, but not determinative, in establish-
ing whether a home office would qualify as a principal place of business.
42
C. A Proposal
Though recent, this new test has also been criticized as expanding the
deduction from its 1976 Tax Act limitations.43 The Tax Court's move away
from a "bright line" approach has created much confusion in this area" and
more opportunities for abuse.45 Moreover, it is questionable whether these
"home offices" create anything more than incidental costs to those taxpayers
who merely keep records and do bookkeeping there." Unlike the home of-
fice that must be fixed up to accommodate clients or customers, it is not
clear whether taxpayers in cases dealing with the "principal place of busi-
ness" exception really expend more money than they otherwise would if they
did not have a home office.4 7
This Article proposes that Congress amend the home office deduction
statute to delete the principal place of business exception and insert in its
place "the taxpayer's sole place of business."48 Not only would this substitu-
the Tax Court denied the taxpayer, a lawyer, a home office deduction because his principal
place of business was his firm.
42. Soliman, 94 T.C. at 26.
43. See, e.g., Robert Kelly, Jr., Tax Court's New Test for Home Offices Expands Availabil-
ity of the Deduction, 19 TAX'N FOR LAW 48 (1990) (suggesting that health care professionals,
accountants, realtors, and entertainers may now take advantage of the home office deduction);
James A. Fellows, Current Status of Home Office Deductions Needs Clarification, 72 J. TAX'N
332 (1990); see also Cadwallader, 919 F.2d at 1275.
44. By contrast, as part of its enactment of the 1976 disallowance provisions, Congress
amended a related part of this section dealing with vacation home rentals, stating that it
wanted to move away from a vague, facts and circumstances approach towards a more objec-
tive standard, so that taxpayers would be prevented from converting personal nondeductible
expenses into deductible expenses. See 1976 S. REP., supra note 21, at 152; 1975 H.R. REP.,
supra note 21, at 165; 1976 JOINT COMM. EXPLANATION, supra note 21, at 143.
45. See supra note 43.
46. See supra note 26 and accompanying text and supra note 28.
47. Dr. Soliman would probably still have a desk in his study, Professor Weissman would
probably still use a part of his home to grade papers or prepare lectures, and Mr. Drucker
would undoubtedly have a violin in his house. See supra notes 37, 38, 40 and accompanying
text. Obviously, however, expenses for such items as business file cabinets, business phone
calls and so forth would continue to be deductible within the guidelines of I.R.C. §§ 162, 167,
and 168.
48. A similar requirement is found in the part of this statute dealing with the "storage use
exception," which is applicable to salespersons. Specifically, the taxpayer may deduct expenses
"allocable to space within the dwelling unit which is used on a regular basis as a storage unit
for the inventory of the taxpayer held for use in the taxpayer's trade or business of selling
products at retail or wholesale, but only if the dwelling unit is the sole fixed location of such
trade or business." I.R.C. sec. 280A(c)(2) (1988) (emphasis added). This is an exception to the
exclusive-use test of the statute and it relates to separately identifiable as suitable for storage.
See 1975 H.R. REP., supra note 21, at 161; 1976 S. REP., supra note 21, at 148; 1976 JOINT
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tion obviate the controversies that have occurred with the "principal place of
business" exception, but also it would be more consistent with the original,
more restrictive, legislative intent.49 This change would eliminate the deduc-
tion for those taxpayers who appear to be converting personal nondeductible
expenses into deductible business ones. Additionally, the alternative would
mean that such taxpayers would be unable to derive further tax gain from
the ability to deduct what amounts to commuting expenses once they have a
statutorily accepted home office.5° Finally, this change would deny, in am-
biguous areas, the home office deduction to taxpayers who are generally in
higher tax brackets. Since most employees have been unable to take this
deduction due to the more recent tax legislation,5 it is often the self-em-
ployed professional who is likely to benefit from the expanded interpretation
of the "principal place of business" exception established by the Tax Court
and the two circuit courts.52
II. DEDUCTIBLE TRAVEL BETWEEN HOME AND WORK
Although most travel between a taxpayer's home and work is a nonde-
ductible personal expense,53 there are some exceptions to this rule. The Ser-
vice and the courts have allowed deductions for travel to a temporary job,
54
COMM. EXPLANATION., supra note 21, at 140. Just as Congress limited this third exception
for business use to the sole fixed location of a salesperson's inventory, Congress should limit
the deduction for home offices, wherein the taxpayer does not actually meet with clients, pa-
tients, or customers, to his "sole fixed location."
49. See supra notes 21-26, 28 and accompanying text.
50. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
51. Employees must also satisfy the requirement that the home office be necessary for the
convenience of the employer. Unreimbursed employee expenses are itemized deductions sub-
ject to both floors of I.R.C. §§ 67 and 68. See supra notes 23, 27.
52. See supra note 43.
53. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.162-2(e), 1.262-1(b)(5) (1986). The Commissioner will generally
not render private letter rulings on the issue of the deductibility of commuting expenses. See
Rev. Proc. 88-45, 1988-2 C.B. 634.
54. See, for example, Rev. Rul. 90-23, 1990-1 C.B. 28, where the Treasury found that
commuting expenses for travel from home to a temporary worksite are deductible regardless of
the distance travelled between the two locations. Prior to this ruling, the temporary jobsite
had to be outside of the metropolitan area in which the taxpayer ordinarily worked in order to
be deductible. See Rev. Rul. 190, 1953-2 C.B. 303. See also Peurifoy v. Commissioner, 358
U.S. 59 (1958), where the Court apparently gave credence to this temporary worksite deduc-
tion but stated that because the Tax Court had created this exception for temporary employ-
ment, and since the government had not questioned its validity, it was essentially ruling on a
factual issue of whether the taxpayer's employment was "temporary" or "indefinite." Id. at
60-61.
Over the years, the Service and the courts have taken opposing views regarding the defini-
tion of "temporary" versus "indefinite" job locations. Currently, the Service adheres to the
position that employment which does not extend beyond two or more years will be deemed
"temporary" if the taxpayer: (1) continues to seek employment in the location of his usual
place of employment, (2) maintains family ties to that area, and (3) incurs duplicate living
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for travel between two places of employment," for the increased costs of
expenses. See Rev. Rul. 83-82, 1983-1 C.B. 45, amplifying Rev. Rul. 60-189, 1960-1 C.B. 60,
where the Service ruled that employment lasting one year or more would not be considered
"temporary." By contrast, the courts have consistently rejected the Service's rules of thumb,
see, e.g., Norwood v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 467, 470 (1976), and have adopted a facts and
circumstances approach. For example, in Albert v. Commissioner, 13 T.C. 129 (1949), the
Tax Court established a test for determining what is a "temporary" job by examining whether
"termination within a short period could be foreseen." Id. at 131. In Albert, the taxpayer, a
junior textile inspector, worked at her job in Lowell, Massachusetts, for two years until a
reduction-in-force caused her dismissal. The Court held that since such reduction-in-force was
not foreseeable, her job was not "temporary." Therefore, she could not deduct commuting
expenses from her home in Gloucester to Lowell. See also Tucker v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.
783 (1971).
The criteria the Tax Court has fashioned to ascertain what is or is not "temporary" employ-
ment includes: (1) the expected duration of the employment, (2) the size of the project, (3) the
availability of a local labor supply, and (4) the actual duration of the employment. In McCal-
lister v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 505 (1978), for instance, the court held that the taxpayer's
employment as an electrician was not temporary because there was no real evidence that the
expected duration was temporary. In addition, the work was a large construction project, the
jobsite was not near a large city, such that the local labor supply had to continually be sup-
planted by workers from outside the area, and the taxpayer left work after twenty and one-half
months without giving an explanation for leaving. Id. The Eighth Circuit has also held that
employment which lasted for three years was "temporary" since there was a substantial risk
that the taxpayer would be laid off during that three-year interval. See Frederick v. United
States, 603 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1979).
Interestingly, the Supreme Court has not actually accepted this exception for commuting
expenses. In fact, at one time, the Tax Court itself questioned the legitimacy of making any
temporary commuting expenses deductible. In Turner v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 27 (1971),
the Tax Court distinguished between business transportation expenses, which are deductible,
and personal commuting expenses which are nondeductible. The court stated that the "tempo-
rary" versus "indefinite" analysis is only relevant to I.R.C. § 162(a)(2) travel expenses and not
to § 162(a) transportation business expenses. The court gave an example of the illogic that
flows from the confusion of these concepts. Assuming that two neighbors each work at the
same job location but one is a permanent employee while the other is only temporary, and they
alternate driving days, the court asked whether it was reasonable that one should be allowed a
deduction while the other was denied one. Turner, 56 T.C. at 32 n.1. In response to the
Turner decision, the Service ruled that there was no distinction between "temporary" and
"indefinite" employment and that commuting expenses are nondeductible. See Rev. Rul.
1976-453, 1976-2 C.B. 86. Nevertheless, it suspended the application of its ruling. See An-
nouncement 77-147, 1977-42 I.R.B. 45 (relying upon News Release IR-1884 (Sept. 23, 1977));
see also McCallister, 70 T.C. at 508 n.5. Yet, as courts have later noted, the exception for
temporary employment derives both from an analysis of whether the taxpayer's choice of resi-
dence is motivated by business or personal considerations, see Frederick, 603 F.2d at 1294-95,
and, by parallel consideration to I.R.C. § 162(a)(2), from a desire to alleviate the burden of a
taxpayer who must incur additional living expenses, because it would be unreasonable to ex-
pect him to move his residence, when employment is only temporary. See id. at 1295; see also
Rev. Rul. 83-82, 1983-1 C.B. 45.
55. See Rev. Rul. 55-109, 1955 C.B. 261 (ruling that where a reservist drives to required
drills at one location in a city and on the same day works at another business location, he may
deduct the transportation expenses in getting from one place of business to another).
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travel to transport tools to a job,5 6 for travel to and from a home office,
57
and for travel which is integral to a job. 5' Because travel to a temporary job
involves unavoidable additional or duplicative costs,59 as does the transpor-
tation of tools to a job," and since travel between two places of business is
not commuting at all but is clearly motivated primarily by business exigen-
cies,6 1 only the latter two exceptions require some modification to prevent
taxpayer abuse. Moreover, Congress has enacted legislation to exclude from
personal income the costs of employer-provided parking62 and has exempted
this commuting fringe benefit from any nondiscrimination requirements.63
This exclusion should also be changed.
A. Travel Between One's Home Office and Other Work Locations
Because a deduction is allowed for travel between two business locations,
it follows that when a taxpayer travels from his home office to another busi-
56. See Fausner v. Commissioner, 413 U.S. 838 (1973). In Fausner, the taxpayer, an
airline pilot, could not deduct any part of his automobile expenses driving to or from the
airport since the Court said it could neither find nor allocate any extra expense incurred by his
carrying his overnight and flight bags. Although the Service ruled that it was now emphasizing
the Fausner "additional cost" test as the sole test to deduct expenses relating to the transporta-
tion of tools, see Rev. Rul. 75-380, 1975-2 C.B. 59, the Service and the courts have at times
continued to use a "but for" test. See, e.g., Grayson v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1201
(1977) (permitting a transportation expense deduction for a taxpayer who otherwise would
have hitchhiked or taken the bus except for his need to transport his tools by car). But see
Pool v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 93 (1977) (allowing a taxpayer to deduct the extra
cost of a pickup truck as opposed to a car); Myers v. Commissioner, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 220
(1981) (denying the taxpayer a deduction because he had incurred no additional expenses).
57. See infra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
58. See infra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
59. See supra note 54.
60. See supra note 56.
61. See supra note 55; see also Flowers v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 465, 474 (1946) ("The
exigencies of business rather than the personal conveniences and necessities of the traveler
must be the motivating factors"). The Flowers decision set forth three requirements for the
deductibility of travel expenses under I.R.C. § 162(a)(2): (1) the expense must be reasonable
and necessary, (2) it must be incurred "away from home," and (3) it must be incurred in
pursuit of business. Id. at 470.
62. Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, sec. 531, 98 Stat. 494, 877 (codified at
I.R.C. § 132(h)(4)(1988)). Congress had also enacted legislation, which excluded certain em-
ployer-provided transportation (vanpooling) that did not discriminate in favor of "officers,
shareholders, or highly compensated employees," and which was applicable to taxable years
after 1978 and before 1986. Energy Tax Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-618, sec. 242, 92 Stat.
3174, 3194 (codified at I.R.C. § 124) (repealed 1990).
63. According to I.R.C. § 132(h)(4) (1988), parking is defined as a "working condition
fringe" benefit, and as such (i.e., as a I.R.C. § 132(a)(3) category benefit) it is not subject to the
nondiscrimination rules of I.R.C. § 132(h)(1) (Supp. 1990). Those rules provide that the fringe
benefit, in order to be excluded for highly compensated employees, must be available on essen-
tially the same conditions to a reasonable classification of employees without discrimination.
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ness location he may also deduct these costs." However, when he travels
from his home office to his other business locations, he is often duplicating
the commuting expenses that other taxpayers may not deduct.65 Limiting
the home office designation as suggested would stop this abuse.66
B. Commuting Defined as Business
Recently, the Tenth Circuit created a new exception to the rule of nonde-
ductibility of commuting expenses. In Pollei v. Commissioner,67 the court
held that police officers who were on call during the drive between their
homes and police headquarters were allowed to deduct their commuting
costs because they were on duty from the moment they left home. By en-
grafting a new exception for commuting that is integral to a taxpayer's job,
the decision, if followed,68 will open the possibility for more taxpayers to
convert their nondeductible commuting expenses into deductible business
64. See Wisconsin Psychiatric Servs., Ltd. v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 839, 849 (1981) (al-
lowing a psychiatrist to deduct the cost of travel to and from his home office, which was his
principal place of business).
65. See supra note 53.
66. See supra notes 29-52 and accompanying text. Again, because it is the higher income
professional who is likely to benefit from the liberalized interpretation of "home office," it is he
or she who also benefits from the commuting expense deduction.
67. 877 F.2d 838 (10th Cir. 1989), rev'g 87 T.C. 869 (1986). In Pollei, the police officers
were required to notify their department when leaving or arriving home, and had to drive
specially equipped, though privately owned, unmarked cars so that they would be in contact
with police headquarters by radio. Id. at 838-39. The circuit court relied on Christey v.
United States, 841 F.2d 809 (8th Cir. 1988) (permitting highway patrol officers who were
required to eat at restaurants adjacent to the highway "to promote public safety and obedi-
ence" to deduct their meal costs as ordinary and necessary business expenses), cert. denied, 489
U.S. 1016 (1989), and on Sibla v. Commissioner, 611 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1980) (allowing
firefighters who were required to contribute money to a meal plan to deduct those amounts as
ordinary and necessary business expenses or to exclude these amounts under I.R.C. § 119).
This Article declines to follow the Christey decision, as it again represents a conversion of
personal expenses into deductible business allowances. The Sibla decision, while literally con-
trary to the Supreme Court's decision in Commissioner v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77 (1977), may
be interpreted to be outside the purview of the definition of "income" established in Commis-
sioner v. Olenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. 426 (1955), since the firefighters may not have had suffi-
cient dominion and control over their funds, which had to be contributed to the meal plan
regardless of whether they ate or not.
The Tenth Circuit emphasized the uniqueness and the public service found in these particu-
lar facts that it believed would avoid a floodgate of litigation on this issue. But see infra note
69. By contrast, the Tax Court found that the taxpayers' expenses were essentially like any
other commuting expenses, reasoning that the officers were not engaged in any business activ-
ity during the travel time. The expenses were therefore nondeductible. See Pollei v. Commis-
sioner, 87 T.C. 869 (1986).
68. The Service has stated that it will not ask the Supreme Court to review the Pollei
decision, but rather will continue to litigate the issue. See Service Will Continue to Litigate
Police Officers' Deductions for Commuting Expenses, 50 TAX NOTES 33 (1991).
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expenses. 69 Hopefully, other circuits will reject this expansion of the deduct-
ibility of commuting expenses, as there seems to be no convincing reason to
except these commuting expenses from the general rule.7 °
C. The Exclusion for Employer-Provided Parking Costs
While enacting comprehensive fringe benefit legislation,7 1 Congress de-
cided to exclude all employer-provided parking without limitation or qualifi-
cation7 2 by classifying such parking as a "working condition fringe"
benefit.73 Yet, the actual definition of a "working condition fringe" benefit is
any employer-provided property or services which would otherwise be de-
ductible under sections 162 or 167 of the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) if
the employee paid for such expenses.7 4 Clearly, parking without a special
exception is a nondeductible personal commuting expense and would not
satisfy the statutory definition.75 The "working condition fringe" benefit ex-
clusion is explained as a means of simplifying the administration of the tax
laws by eliminating the need for an income inclusion coupled with a match-
ing deduction.7 6 That rationale seems inapplicable here, because commuting
expenses are normally not deductible. Moreover, parking, which may be
provided by a business solely to its officers or highly-compensated employ-
ees, will nevertheless be excluded from these wealthy taxpayers' income tax
bases.
77
69. See Scott N. Cairns, et al., Scope of Commuting Expenses Broadened as a Result of
Recent Developments, 44 TAX'N FOR ACCT. 340, 341 (1990), in which the authors suggest that
other taxpayers "such as emergency personnel, brokers, and executive assistants" attempt to
deduct the full amount of their commuting costs.
70. Although this new exception currently affects primarily middle class taxpayers, allow-
ance of this deduction distorts horizontal equity since other taxpayers of equal income will
have to pay more in taxes than taxpayers who can fit their commuting within this exception.
71. See supra note 62; see also infra notes 102-12 and accompanying text.
72. See supra note 63.
73. I.R.C. § 132(h)(4) (1988).
74. Id. § 132(d).
75. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 98TH CONG., 1ST SEss. GENERAL Ex-
PLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984 857
n.85 (Comm. Print 1984) [hereinafter 1984 JOINT EXPLANATION].
76. See generally Julie A. Roin, United They Stand, Divided They Fall: Public Choice
Theory and the Tax Code, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 62, 68 (1988); Peter J. Wiedenbeck, Nondis-
crimination in Employee Benefits: False Starts and Future Trends, 52 TENN. L. REV. 167, 172
(1985); Wendy G. Shaller, The New Fringe Benefit Legislation: A Codification of Historical
Inequities, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 425, 426 (1985) [hereinafter Shaller, The New Fringe Benefit
Legislation].
77. Parking is not subject to the nondiscrimination requirements of I.R.C. § 132(h)(1)
(1988). See supra note 63. Under the original House bill, the parking exclusion was in fact
subject to these rules. See H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1603, 1605-06 (1984)
[hereinafter 1984 H.R. REP.]; see also H.R. CONF. REP. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1168, 1171-
72 (1984), reprinted in 1984-3 C.B. 1, 422, 425-26 (1984) [hereinafter 1984 CONF. REP.].
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There is no justification for the parking exclusion, because parking merely
constitutes another typical commuting expense.7 If the exclusion is permit-
ted, however, at a minimum, it should be subject to nondiscrimination
requirements.79
III. THE MOVING EXPENSE DEDUCTION
A. Legislative Background
Before the Revenue Act of 1964,80 there existed an exclusion for reim-
bursed moving expenses only if made by a taxpayer's current employer."'
Legislation enacted in 196482 attempted to equalize the treatment between
reimbursed and unreimbursed taxpayers and between those who received
payments from new as well as from current employers.83 The 1964 enact-
ment covered certain direct moving expenses 4 although it imposed certain
distance and continued duration of employment limitations.8 5 Later,
78. Commuting expenses are nondeductible. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
79. As the House Report on the original bill explained:
Thus, for example, if an employer makes free or reduced-cost parking available to all
its employees according to seniority or on a "first-come, first-served" basis, and if
those employees who obtain parking constitute a fair cross-section of all employees,
then the fair market value of the parking provided is excluded under the bill.... On
the other hand, if an employer provides free or reduced cost parking only to highly
compensated employees without legitimate business reasons, the fair market value of
the parking is not excluded for those highly compensated employees.
1984 H.R. REP., supra note 77, at 1606. Unfortunately, this requirement was dropped. 1984
CONF. REP., supra note 77.
80. Pub. L. No. 88-272, 78 Stat. 19 (1964).
81. See Rev. Rul. 54-429, 1954-2 C.B. 53. The ruling allowed the exclusion on the ration-
ale that payment of these expenses by a taxpayer's employer and reimbursement by that em-
ployer were essentially the same. It also stated that such payments were not compensatory in
nature, but with the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487, which requires
reimbursements first to be included in gross income and then deducted, this notion is obsolete.
82. Sec. 213, 78 Stat. at 50-52 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 217 (1988 & Supp. 1990)).
83. See H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 59 (1963) [hereinafter 1963 H.R. REP.];
S. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 71 (1964) [hereinafter 1964 S. REP.].
84. Three types of cost expenses were deductible: moving household goods, transporting
the employee and his family from their old residence, and meals and lodging in transit. Sec.
213(a), 78 Stat. at 50-51 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 217(b)(1)(A), (B)(1988)).
85. Under the 1964 Act, the taxpayer had to move at least twenty miles farther than
where his former residence was located to his former place of work (i.e., his commuting dis-
tance must have been increased by at least twenty miles) or, if he had no old principal place of
business, his new place of business had to be at least twenty miles from his old residence. Also,
he had to continue to be employed full-time after the move for at least thirty-nine weeks. Id
Exceptions to the continued employment requirement are the taxpayer's death, disability or
employer-motivated job termination. See I.R.C. § 217(d)(l) (1988). Self-employed individu-
als have a separate test for continued employment qualification. See I.R.C, § 217(c)(2)(B), (f)
(1988). Moves occurring on the occasion of the taxpayer's retirement are therefore ineligible
for the deduction since the taxpayer cannot satisfy the continued employment requirement,
[Vol. 41:581
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although the Tax Reform Act of 196986 liberalized the scope of the moving
expense deduction by covering both direct and indirect moving expenses,8 7 it
still placed dollar limitations on their deductibility."8 Furthermore, the stat-
ute extended the distance requirements of the 1964 Act.8 9 To truly equalize
the treatment between reimbursed and unreimbursed expenses, the 1969 leg-
islation required that a taxpayer first include his reimbursements in his gross
income and then, to the extent that the expenses qualified, take a deduc-
tion." With several modifications,9 the 1969 Act represents the law as it
unless he is exempt from this requirement due to retirement from the military. See Chamber-
lin v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 1136 (1982); see also infra note 91.
86. Pub. L. No. 91-172, sec. 231(a), 83 Stat. 487, reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 509,
618-619.
87. With the 1969 Tax Reform Act, costs for househunting, for temporary living ex-
penses, and for selling one's former home were included in the category of deductible moving
expenses. See id. (adding I.R.C. § 217(b)(I)(C)-(E)).
88. The 1969 Act placed a $1,000 limitation on indirect costs of pre-move househunting
trips and temporary living expenses and a total limitation of $2,500 on those expenses plus the
expense of selling the taxpayer's former residence. See id. at 577-78 (adding I.R.C.
§ 217(b)(3)).
89. The Act extended the distance for the taxpayer's move from twenty to fifty miles. See
id. at 578 (amending I.R.C. § 217(c)(1)).
90. Id. at sec. 231(b), 83 Stat. at 579-80 (adding I.R.C. § 82). See STAFF OF THE JOINT
COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAX'N, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM
AcT OF 1969 102 (1970), [hereinafter 1970 JOINT COMM. EXPLANATION]; S. REP. No. 552,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 110 (1969) [hereinafter 1969 S. REP.]; H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. 2, at 54 (1969).
91. In 1970, Congress provided a transition rule for the greater distance requirements of
the 1969 Act. Act of Dec. 31, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-642, sec. 2, 84 Stat. 1880; see H.R. REP.
No. 1743, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1970); S. REP. No. 1476, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1-8 (1970).
The Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520, increased the limits from
$1,000 to $1,500 and from $2,500 to $3,000, sec. 506(b), 90 Stat. at 1568 (amending I.R.C.
§ 217(b)(3)), while reducing the distance requirements from 50 miles to 35 miles, sec. 506(a),
90 Stat. at 1568 (amending I.R.C. § 217(c)(1)). The increased dollar limitations were intended
to reflect increased costs due to inflation, and the decreased distance requirements reflected the
need to conserve oil because of the Mid-East Oil Embargo. See 1975 H.R. REP., supra note
21, at 155; 1976 S. REP., supra note 21, at 141; 1976 JOINT COMM. EXPLANATION, supra note
21, at 133. In addition, the 1976 Act excepted the military from many of the moving expense
deduction requirements (i.e., mileage and the 39-week rule as well as the requirement to first
include reimbursements in income) because Congress felt that the administrative difficulties
were too great for the military as it had no way of valuing in-kind reimbursements. Sec.
506(c), 90 Stat. at 1568-69 (adding new I.R.C. § 217(g)), see 1975 H.R. REP., supra note 21, at
156; 1976 S. REP., supra note 21, at 141-42; 1976 JOINT COMM. EXPLANATION, supra note 21,
at 134.
In 1978 the moving expense deduction was amended to provide higher dollar limitations of
$4,500 (up from $1,500) and $6,000 (up from $3,000). See Tax Treatment Extension Act of
1977, Pub. L. No. 95-615, sec. 204(a), 92 Stat. 3097, 3106-07 (1978) (adding new I.R.C.
§ 217(h) for foreign moves to make U.S. workers more competitive with foreign workers and
to reflect the greater costs of such moves); H.R. REP. No. 1798, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978);
see also S. REP. No. 940, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 112-13 (1981) (referring to this liberalization in
seeking even higher limitations). The 1978 Act also increased limits for deducting temporary
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exists today, except that now the reimbursement allowance is a personal
itemized deduction.9 2
B. A Proposal
Essentially, the moving expense deduction is a mixed personal9 3 and busi-
ness94 cost. To the extent that it reflects business motivation, it is justified.
Yet job-related moves also resemble commuting, which is considered a per-
sonal nondeductible expense."a Although there has been virtually no contro-
versy in interpreting the language of the statute,9 6 and there has been little
criticism of the provision itself,97 this Article proposes that the benefits of
living expenses from 30 to 90 days and allowed deductions for certain storage fees. Sec. 204(a),
92 Stat. at 3106.
92. The Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, sec. 132(c), 100 Stat 2085, 2116,
deleted I.R.C. § 62(a)(8) from the list of adjustments to income (i.e., deductions subtracted
from gross income to arrive at AGI). Although now an itemized deduction, moving expenses
are excepted from the 2% floor on miscellaneous itemized deductions. See I.R.C. § 67(b)(6)
(1988). However, meals are still subject to being reduced first by the 20% meal disallowance
of I.R.C. § 274(n) (1988 & Supp. 1990) before being totalled for the $3,000 limitation. Meals
are not subject to the taxpayer's presence requirement of I.R.C. § 274(k) (1)(B) (1988). See
Technical Corrections Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, sec. 1001(g)(5), 102 Stat. 3342, 3352.
Moreover, moving expenses are subject to the overall reduction of itemized deductions im-
posed by I.R.C. § 68 (Supp. 1990). See supra note 8. In lieu of providing detailed substantia-
tion of travel expenses as required by I.R.C. § 274(d) (1988), taxpayers may claim a deduction
of nine cents per mile for their job-related move. See Rev. Proc. 91-67, 1991-52 I.R.B. 11.
93. There are "strong personal elements" in the moving expense deduction, emphasizing
the dual nature of this deduction. Tax Reform, 1969: Hearings Before the House Comm. on
Ways and Means, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 5499 (statement of Edwin S. Cohen, Assistant Secretary
of the Treasury for Tax Policy) [hereinafter 1969 Hearings].
94. American labor is most efficient if it can move to where the jobs are. Thus, the mov-
ing expense deduction is seen as a means of reducing unemployment and increasing productiv-
ity. See 1969 S. REP., supra note 90, at 108; H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at
75 (1969); 1970 JoINT COMM. EXPLANATION, supra note 90, at 101-02; 1969 Hearings, supra
note 93, at 4; see also 2 1984 TREASURY PLAN, supra note 1, at 123. Because of this rationale,
the Treasury Department proposed to increase dollar limitations on moving costs to allow a
deduction of $10,000 (up from $3,000) and of $3,000 (up from $1,500) for domestic moves,
and of $10,000 (up from $6,000) and of $6,000 (up from $4,500) for foreign moves. These
higher limitations would also reflect the increased costs of such moves. Id. The moving ex-
pense deduction is viewed as a cost of earning income. 1970 JOINT COMM. EXPLANATION,
supra note 90, at 102.
95. See supra note 53.
96. See, e.g., Fogg v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 310 (1987) (finding the moving of a tax-
payer's sailboat to be a deductible expense of moving his "personal effects"); Aksomitas v.
Commissioner, 50 T.C. 679 (1968) (holding the moving of a taxpayer's yacht to be a nonde-
ductible moving cost).
97. The section has, however, been criticized for its unfairness to married working couples
who are limited to a single set of dollar amounts even where each spouse formerly lived in
widely different locations. See Toni Robinson & Mary M. Wenig, Marry in Haste, Repent at
Tax Time: Marital Status as a Tax Determinant, 8 VA. TAX REV. 773, 840 (1989).
The low dollar limitations have also been attacked as not being reflective of contemporary
moving costs. See supra note 94; see also Lee Objects to Change in Threshold for Moving
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this provision need to be refocused upon those for whom these costs create
the greatest burden. To effectuate this proposal, the following changes
should be made: (1) the deduction should again be made an adjustment to
income, under I.R.C. section 62, so that nonitemizers (generally lower or
middle income taxpayers) may receive this benefit;9" (2) the moving expense
dollar limitations should be adjusted to reflect contemporary costs of an av-
erage-income taxpayer's move;99 and (3) the deduction should be phased out
for upper income taxpayers. Just as the original dollar limitations were
placed on indirect moving expenses in order to prevent a windfall to the
wealthy,"c° the moving expense deduction should be re-directed to avoid the
abuse of converting personal nondeductible expenses into allowable deduc-
tions and to add more progressivity into the tax system.
Expenses, 91 TAX NOTES TODAY 223-55 (Oct. 30, 1991) (statement of David A. Brown of the
Lee Company) [hereinafter Brown] (commenting on proposed legislation H.R. 562, introduced
by Rep. Donnelly, which would have increased the distance requirements from 35 miles to 200
miles, essentially eliminating the deduction for most taxpayers); infra note 99.
98. By 1988, about half of those who could have benefitted from this provision were de-
nied its aid because they did not itemize. See Brown, supra note 97; see also supra note 92.
99. Indirect moving expense dollar limitations, apart from foreign moves, have remained
constant since 1976. Their increased costs have been estimated at $7,500 (converted to 1991
dollars) and at $10,000 (based upon a review of a typical taxpayer's indirect moving costs), see
2 1984 TREASURY PLAN, supra note 1, at 123. However, guidelines should not be tied to
either standard, but rather should depend upon a review of a middle income taxpayers' typical
moving costs. Including upper income taxpayers' typical expenses would merely reflect a
greater portion of costs dictated by personal considerations. See infra note 100.
100. The $1,500 limitation on indirect expenses will provide the needed relief from
the financial burden of moving for the great majority of employees; that is employees
with average earnings and average moving expenses. Total expenses for these indi-
rect costs may exceed the limitation in cases of high-income employees. Their added
costs are attributable to their higher standard of living which their increased earning
power makes possible and should therefore properly be considered as personal rather
than business related. For example, a corporate executive who is transferred is likely
to have above-average temporary living expenses by staying in a more expensive hotel
and above average real estate costs from selling a more expensive home. The taxpay-
ing public should not be required to defray... these more-than-average expenses. In
addition, the $1,500 limitation reduces the possibility of abuse, or extravagant ex-
penditures, at the expense of the general public.
U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, STUDIES AND PROPOSALS 216 (1969).
1992]
Catholic University Law Review
IV. FRINGE BENEFITS1 0 1
A. Background
In 1984, after an absence of consistent guidelines,1 °2 Congress enacted
comprehensive fringe benefit legislation, 0 3 which has been modified only
slightly since that date."° This legislation produced major reform by pro-
101. This Article will address only those fringe benefits that have been excluded on quasi-
business justifications (i.e., I.R.C. §§ 132, 117(d) (1988 & Supp. 1990)).
Clearly, in terms of revenue lost, the major fringe benefits are the exclusions for pensions,
health care, and life insurance. See I.R.C. §§ 79, 101(b), & 106 (1988 & Supp. 1990).
Specifically, in 1992, $91 billion in revenue is estimated to have been lost because of the
exclusion of these fringe benefits. See GAO Report Cites Effects of Changing Tax Treatment of
Fringe Benefits, 92 TAX NoTEs TODAY 76-16 (Apr. 9, 1992) [hereinafter 1992 GAO Report
Summary] (summarizing GAO/GGD-92-43, released Apr. 7, 1992). These expenses are
clearly personal costs which are not within the scope of this Article. However, because of the
immense dollar impact and the inequities involved between those who provide these benefits
tax free and those who would need to purchase them with after-tax dollars, and because of
the disproportionate value of these benefits for higher bracket taxpayers (vertical inequity),
potential changes to these provisions should be highlighted. The GAO Report, although
containing no specific recommendations, suggests that alternatively these benefits could be
fully taxed or capped in terms of the dollar amounts excluded. Additionally, the report
suggests that to ease the inequities while allowing lower income taxpayers to retain their
coverage without incurring a tax, a credit could be allowed to offset some or all of these
expenses (depending on the taxpayer's income bracket) which would first be included in the
taxpayer's income. Id.
This Article suggests that these benefits could also be phased out and eliminated for upper
income levels. There would be less erosion of the tax base and more tax equity, and it is
unlikely that such action would affect coverage for these individuals. According to the GAO
Report, taxpayers in the upper brackets would continue to contribute to their pensions and to
purchase health and life insurance even without a tax break. Id.
102. See, e.g., T.D. 946, 4 C.B. 11 (1921) (allowing free train tickets for railroad employees
to be excluded as gifts); Treas. Reg. § 1.117-3(a) (1957) (permitting tuition remitted to faculty
members' children to be excluded as scholarships); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-16(a), 40 Fed.
Reg. 41,119 (1975) (considering the exclusion of free airline passes from airline employees'
income); Prop. Treas. Regs. under I.R.C. § 117, 41 Fed. Reg. 48, 132 (1976), withdrawn,
I.R.S. News Release IR-1735, 1977-6 I.R.B. 38 (1977) (considering tuition remitted to faculty
members' children as income taxable to university employee); Treasury Dep't Discussion
Draft of Proposed Income Tax Regulations on Fringe Benefits, 1981 Fed. Taxes (P-H)
70,181 (proposing that all employee fringe benefits, except those excluded as working condi-
tion fringe benefits or excluded for administrative convenience, be taxable as income).
Before enacting the 1984 fringe benefit legislation, Congress had imposed several moratori-
ums prohibiting the Treasury Department's issuance of regulations on fringe benefits. See Act
of Oct. 7, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-427, sec. 1, 92 Stat. 996, 996 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 62
(1978)); Act of Dec. 29, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-1687, sec. 1, 93 Stat. 1275, 1275; Economic
Recovery Tax Act (ERTA) of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, sec. 801, 95 Stat. 172, 349.
103. Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, secs. 531-32, 98 Stat. 494, 877-87 (codi-
fied at I.R.C. §§ 132 and 117(d) (1988 & Supp. 1990)).
Note, however, that if another section expressly provides for a particular fringe benefit, ex-
cept for an I.R.C. § 132(e) "de minimis fringe" benefit, that other section controls. I.R.C.
§ 132(j) (1988).
104. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 contained comprehensive non-discrimination rules
which would have applied to these provisions. Pub. L. No. 99-514, sec. 1151(a), 100 Stat.
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viding that fringe benefits not explicitly excluded by statute are includable in
gross income. 105 Although tied to nondiscrimination requirements," s these
"4new" rules are essentially historical inequities which only benefit employees
in certain industries."0 7 Essentially, "no additional cost service fringe" bene-
fits (aiding those in the airline, other transportation, and hotel industries),'0 8
"qualified employee discounts" (benefitting those in the retail industries)," ° 9
2085, 2494 (codified at I.R.C. § 89 (1988) (repealed 1989)). However, the Debt Limit Exten-
sion Act, Pub. L. No. 101-140, secs. 201-04, 103 Stat. 830, 830-33 (1989), retroactively re-
pealed § 89 and left §§ 117(d) and 132 with their individual nondiscrimination rules.
The 1986 Act also included, mostly for clarification, some technical amendments to the
1984 fringe benefit legislation. In defining an employee discount in I.R.C. § 132(c)(3)(A),
Congress substituted "are provided by the employer to an employee for use by such employee"
for "are provided to the employee by the employer." 1986 Tax Reform Act, sec. 1853(a)(2),
100 Stat. at 2870. In defining a dependent child who qualifies as an individual treated as an
employee for purposes of the "no-additional-cost" and "qualified employee discount fringe"
benefits, Congress added an age restriction to I.R.C. § 132(f)(2)(B)(ii) so that the section
would read, "both of whose parents are deceased and who has not attained age 25." Id. at sec.
1853(a)(1), I.R.C. § 132(f)(2)(b)(ii) (1988).
The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272, sec.
13207(a)(1), 100 Stat. 82, 319 (1986) (adding I.R.C. § 132(f)(3)), incorporated a special rule
qualifying the parents of airline personnel to be recipients of tax-free "no-additional-cost ser-
vice fringe" benefits.
The Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, sec. 6066, 102
Stat. 3342, 3702-03 (adding I.R.C. § 132(h)(8)), equated the services of air cargo transport
with air passenger transportation for the purposes of the "no-additional-cost fringe" benefit.
105. 1984 Tax Reform Act, sec. 531(c) (amending I.R.C. § 61(a)(1)). Congress stated that
one of its main purposes in enacting the fringe benefit legislation was to provide clear bounda-
ries for these benefits without substantially eroding the tax base. 1984 H.R. REP., supra note
77, at 1591-92; 1984 JOINT EXPLANATION, supra note 75, at 840-41. When the value of a
fringe benefit is included in a taxpayer's income, it is included at its fair market value less the
money the taxpayer-recipient paid for it. Id. at 842.
106. I.R.C. § 132(h)(1) (1988 & Supp. 1990). Congress thought that it would be inequita-
ble to exclude benefits that are provided solely to highly paid executives. 1984 JOINT EXPLA-
NATION, supra note 75, at 842; 1984 H.R. REP., supra note 77, at 1592; see also supra note 63.
107. See Shaller, The New Fringe Benefit Legislation, supra note 76; see also 1984 JOINT
EXPLANATION, supra note 75, at'843.
108. A "no additional cost service fringe" benefit is defined as an employer-provided ser-
vice which is offered for sale to customers in the ordinary course of the employer's line of
business in which the employee is performing services, and for which the employer incurs no
additional cost, including forgone revenue. I.R.C. § 132(b) (1988). It is subject to the nondis-
crimination rule of I.R.C. § 132(h)(1) (1988 & Supp. 1990), see supra note 63, and is available
to current, retired and/or disabled employees, their spouses or surviving spouses, their depen-
dent children, and, in a special perk for air transportation employees, their parents. I.R.C.
§ 132(f) (1988 & Supp. 1990).
109. A "qualified employee discount" is defined as an employee discount with respect to
any property, except real or investment property, which does not exceed the employer's gross
profit percentage or, in the case of services, twenty percent of the sales price. I.R.C. § 132(c)
(1988 & Supp. 1990). It is subject to the nondiscrimination requirements of I.R.C. § 132(h)(1)
(1988 & Supp. 1990), see supra note 63, and is available to current, retired and/or disabled
employees, their spouses or surviving spouses, and their dependent children. I.R.C. § 132(f)
(1988 & Supp. 1990).
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and "qualified tuition reductions""' (providing perks to those in the educa-
tion field) are exempt from income ostensibly because of their business pur-
pose"'. and because of valuation and administrative difficulties. "2 However,
their business purpose is questionable" 3 and certainly intertwined with a
significant personal motivation and use. Moreover, since the 1984 legisla-
tion, there has been much guidance on valuation, in the form of regula-
tions, ' 4 which has been made available to assist employers with the taxing
of these benefits.
B. A Proposal
In order to prevent the erosion of the tax base and to restore equity, the
exclusions for "no additional cost services," "qualified employee discounts,"
and "qualified tuition reductions" should be repealed."' Alternatively, as a
more moderate change consistent with the other proposals in this Article,
the exclusion should be phased out and eliminated for upper income taxpay-
ers in order to broaden the tax base and reinstitute more progressivity and
fairness into the tax system.
110. A "qualified tuition reduction" is defined as a reduction in tuition given to current,
retired and/or disabled employees of an educational institution at the undergraduate level their
spouses, or surviving spouses, and their dependent children. I.R.C. § 117(d)(2) (1988). The
"qualified tuition reduction fringe" is subject to nondiscrimination requirements. I.R.C.
§ 117(d)(3) (1988); see supra note 63.
111. See 1984 H.R. REP., supra note 77, at 1591 ("Although employees may receive an
economic benefit from the availability of these free or discounted goods or services, employers
often have valid business reasons, other than simply providing compensation, for encouraging
employees to avail themselves of the products which they sell to the public."); 1984 JoINT
EXPLANATION, supra note 75, at 840.
112. See 1984 JoiNT EXPLANATION, supra note 75, at 842. Note, however, that there are
recordkeeping requirements that must be satisfied to qualify for the exclusion. I.R.C. § 6039D
(1988 & Supp. 1990); see also I.R.S. Announcement 86-20, 1986-7 I.R.B. 34.
113. A fringe benefit that reflects a true business expense is excludible as a "working condi-
tion fringe" benefit under I.R.C. § 132(d) (1988 & Supp. 1990). A "working condition fringe"
benefit is defined as an employer-provided benefit, which if paid for by the employee, would be
deductible as a business expense under I.R.C. §§ 162 or 167. Id. For example, the money a
county pays its police officers for their uniforms or for dog food for their police dogs is exclud-
ible as a "working condition fringe" benefit since both are deductible business expenses under
I.R.C. § 162. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-09-041 (Dec. 3, 1990).
While a current employee may be sampling and/or displaying his employer's wares and thus
demonstrate some business purpose, it is more difficult to understand how this same rationale
applies to current retired and/or disabled employees and their families. See supra notes 106-
09.
114. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-21 (effective Jan. 1, 1989); Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2T (effective 1985-
1988); see also Treas. Reg. §§ 1.132-1 to 8 (effective Jan. 1, 1989); Temp. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.132-
IT to -8T (effective 1985-1988).
115. See Shaller, The New Fringe Benefit Legislation, supra note 76, at 444.
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V. BUSINESS MEALS AND ENTERTAINMENT
A. Historical Context
In 1961, President Kennedy recommended disallowing all business en-
tertainment deductions, including those expenses relating to entertainment
facilities, 1 6 and curtailing deductions for business travel and business gifts.
He also suggested a maximum deduction (between four and seven dollars per
day) for business meals, but only if the meals were part of an activity that
was directly related to the taxpayer's business and was not merely produc-
tive of goodwill.' 17 These proposals were intended to prevent personal and
extravagant expenses from being borne by the federal government (i.e., by
other taxpayers)."1 However, Congress did not adopt President Kennedy's
plan.119 Instead, Congress enacted legislation on business meals and en-
tertainment similar to that which exists today.' 20 Congress enacted a disal-
lowance provision under which such expenses, in addition to qualifying as
business expenses under I.R.C. section 162, had to be either "directly re-
lated" 1 21 or "associated with"' 2 2 the taxpayer's trade or business. Business
meals merely had to be furnished in surroundings conducive to business dis-
cussion. 123 Mixed business and personal foreign travel were limited to either
116. An entertainment facility is an "item of personal or real property owned, rented, or
used by a taxpayer during the taxable year for, or in connection with, an activity normally
considered to be of an entertainment nature." S. REP. No. 1036, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 n.1
(1980). An example of an entertainment facility is a yacht or hunting lodge. See 2 1984
TREASURY PLAN, supra note 1, at 81. The term also includes, inter alia, fishing camps, swim-
ming pools, tennis courts, bowling alleys, ski lodges, and beach cottages. H.R. CONF. REP.
No. 1800, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 248 (1978).
117. See Detailed Explanation of the President's Recommendations Contained in His
Message on Taxation, President's 1961 Tax Recommendations: Hearings Before the House
Comm. on Ways and Means, 87th Cong., Ist Sess. 253, 283 (1961) [hereinafter 1961 Hearings].
The exact figure of the deduction had not been determined, but it was expected to fall within
the four to seven dollar range. Id. This reform was estimated to produce an additional
$250,000,000 per year in revenue. Id at 44 (Statement of Honorable C. Douglas Dillon, Secre-
tary of the Treasury).
118. Id.
119. Congress reacted to anticipated hardships in the entertainment industry and empha-
sized that valid business purposes were also being served, especially for salespersons. S. REP.
No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 24, 25 (1962); H.R. REP. No. 2508, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 19-26
(1962).
120. Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, sec. 4, 76 Stat. 960, 974-77 (codified at
I.R.C. § 274 (1988 & Supp. 1990)).
121. I.R.C. § 274(a)(1)(A) (1988); see Treas. Reg. § 1.274-2(c) (as amended in 1985).
122. Treas. Reg. § 1.274-2(d) (as amended in 1985). This more tenuous business relation-
ship requires that the entertainment precede or follow a substantial and bona fide business
discussion. I.R.C. § 274(a)(1)(A) (1988).
123. Revenue Act of 1962, sec. 4 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 274(e)(1) (1988)). An
actual business discussion was not required. Treas. Reg. § 1.274-2(f)(2)(i)(a) (as amended in
1985). This special exception for business meals was repealed by the 1986 Tax Reform Act.
See infra note 131.
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one week or a maximum of twenty-five percent of personal time in relation
to the total amount of time spent abroad in order to be deductible. 24 Fi-
nally, travel, meals, and entertainment were made subject to more specific
substantiation requirements.
25
In 1978, President Carter proposed the disallowance of all business en-
tertainment deductions and only half deductions for business meal ex-
penses.1 26 Like the Kennedy plan, it was not enacted. 127 Instead, Congress
merely curtailed the deductibility of most entertainment facilities.' 21 In
1984, the Treasury Department issued its plan, which would have generally
denied all deductions for entertainment expenses. Business meals, however,
would be excepted and would be required to be furnished in a "clear business
setting" and have a dollar cap on the amounts deductible. 129 Again, Con-
124. Revenue Act of 1962, sec. 217 (codified at I.R.C. § 274(c)(1988)).
125. Id. at sec. 4 (codified at I.R.C. § 274(d) (1988)); see Treas. Reg. § 1.274-5 (as
amended in 1985). Congress enacted the substantiation requirements to insure that taxpayers
were not deducting purely personal expenses as business costs. See H.R. REP. No. 1447, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1962). The Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, sec. 179(b)(1), 98
Stat. 494, 877 (codified at I.R.C. § 274(d)(4) (1988)), added "listed property," (as defined by
§ 280F(d)(4)), to those items requiring this substantiation. In addition, the 1984 Act further
restricted the substantiation rules; however, the "contemporaneous" recordkeeping require-
ment was later repealed by the Act of May 24, 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-44, sec. l(a), 99 Stat. 77,
77 (1985).
126. See Message from the President of the United States Transmitting Proposals for Tax
Reduction and Reform in the President's 1978 Tax Reduction and Reform Proposals, 1978:
Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 11, 341 (1978).
President Carter also urged the disallowance of first class air travel (over coach) and of costs
for attending foreign conventions. Id. at 341.
In making his proposals, President Carter criticized the fact that allowing deductions for
these expenses which contain much personal benefit was doing so at the public's expense. "In
effect, present law requires the many taxpayers who cannot or do not obtain these subsidized
entertainment and travel benefits themselves to help pay for the benefits enjoyed by others.
These benefits tend to be disproportionately distributed to upper-income taxpayers." Id.
127. In 1982, the Senate passed a proposal like the Carter plan, but it was eliminated in
conference. S. REP. No. 760, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 556 (1982).
128. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, sec. 361, 92 Stat. 2763, 2847 (codified at
I.R.C. § 274(a)(I)(B),(2)(C) (1988)); Technical Corrections Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-222,
sec. 103(a)(10), 94 Stat. 194, 212 (1980), (amending I.R.C. § 274(a)(2)(C)). If costs relating to
the use of a facility are disallowed under this section, the facility itself is considered to be a
personal, rather than a business asset. Revenue Act of 1962 sec. 4 (codified at I.R.C. § 274(g)
(1988)). Dues for clubs, such as sporting or social clubs, continue to be deductible if they are
primarily for the taxpayer's business and if the item is directly related to the active conduct of
that business. Revenue Act of 1978 sec. 361(b) (codified at 274(a)(2)(C) (1988)). Also, in
1978, restrictions were made on deductions for foreign conventions, see id. sec. 701(g), later
modified by the 1980 Tax Act. That Act disallowed expenses for attending a foreign conven-
tion unless, on a facts and circumstances basis, it was "as reasonable" for the meeting to be
held outside, as within North America, Act of Dec. 28, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-608, sec. 4(a), 94
Stat. 3550, 3552; see S. REP. No. 1031, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-13 (1980).
129. 2 1984 TREASURY PLAN, supra note 1, at 83. The deduction for business meals would
be restricted to ten dollars for breakfast, fifteen dollars for lunch, and twenty-five dollars for
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gress made more modest reforms, disallowing twenty percent of the cost of
business entertainment and meals,13 and requiring a closer business connec-
tion for deductible business meals.
131
B. A Proposal
Like others in the past 132 and present, 133 this Article proposes that the
entertainment deduction should be eliminated and that the deduction for
business meals should be limited to dollar amounts like those proposed in
dinner (including tax and gratuity). Id. Arguing that its proposal was based on ideas of fair-
ness, the Treasury Report stated:
The current treatment of business entertainment expenses encourages taxpayers to
indulge personal entertainment desires while at work or in the company of business
associates. The majority of taxpayers, however, do not benefit from this incentive.
Most hold jobs that do not permit business entertainment ....
Current law thus creates a preference for the limited class of taxpayers willing and
able to satisfy personal entertainment desires in a setting with at least some business
trappings. Lunches are deductible for a business person who eats with clients at an
elegant restaurant, but not for a plumber who eats with other workers at the con-
struction site. A party for friends of a business person is deductible if they are busi-
ness associates, but a party for friends of a secretary, sales clerk, or nurse is not
deductible.
Id,
In a second proposal, President Reagan offered an alternative recommendation that no en-
tertainment expense be deductible, but that expenses for business meals be deductible up to
twenty-five dollars, then fifty percent beyond that dollar limit. U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY,
THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS TO THE CONGRESS FOR FAIRNESS, GROWTH, AND SIMPLICITY
(May 1985) (sometimes referred to as TREASURY II).
130. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, sec. 142, 100 Stat. 2085, 2117, 2120,
(codified at I.R.C. § 274(n) (1988 & Supp. 1990)). While adopting the partial disallowance
provision, Congress recalled President Kennedy's 1961 Tax Message that "'too many firms
and individuals have devised means of deducting too many personal living expenses as business
expenses, thereby charging a large part of their cost to the Federal Government.' " 1986 S.
REP., supra note 3, at 67; see also supra note 120.
131. 1986 Tax Reform Act, sec. 142(b). Section 142(b) repealed I.R.C. § 274(e)(1),
thereby requiring that business meals be subject to the "directly related" or "associated with"
limitations of I.R.C. § 274(a). See supra notes 121, 122.
The 1986 legislation also subjects business meals to the requirements that they not be lavish
or extravagant under the circumstances, although such terms are left undefined, and that they
be eaten while the taxpayer is present. 1986 Tax Reform Act, sec. 142(a) (codified at I.R.C.
§ 274(k) (1988)). In addition, the 1986 Act limited the amount allowable as a deduction for an
entertainment ticket to the ticket's face value, thus disallowing any additional amounts paid to
"scalpers;" similar amount limitations were applied to skyboxes. Id. sec. 142(b) (codified at
I.R.C. sec. 2740) (1988 & Supp. 1990)). Small additional limitations, with many exceptions,
were applied to luxury water travel. Id. sec. 142(b) (codified as amended at 274(m) (1988)).
132. See, e.g., supra notes 116, 126, 127 and 129.
133. See Text of Pearlman Memo on Revenue Raised by Curbing Business Meals and En-
tertainment Deduction, 88 TAX NOTES TODAY 160-6 (1988); see, e.g., 134 CONG. REC. S7933,
S7958 (daily ed. June 16, 1988) (statement of Sen. Bradley) (proposing the phase-out of the
entertainment and meal deduction for AGI over $360,000).
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the 1984 Treasury Department plan.' 34 Alternatively, since it is the wealthy
who disproportionately benefit from these provisions 3 5 and who can better
absorb the personal element of the cost due to their greater discretionary
income,' 3 6 these deductions should be phased out and eliminated for upper
bracket taxpayers. In this way, more progressivity would be reinjected into
the Tax Code.
VI. THE DEPENDENT CARE CREDIT AND THE DEPENDENT CARE
PROGRAM EXCLUSION
A. Legislative Background of the Dependent Care Credit
The 1954 Tax Code introduced a deduction for dependent' 3 7 or childcare
expenses, of up to $600, that enabled a woman or widowed taxpayer to
work.'3 ' The deduction was phased out for married taxpayers earning an
adjusted gross income beginning at $4,500 and was unavailable to taxpayers
with a combined income of $5,100 or more.'3 9 During the 1960s and the
first half of the 1970s, adjustments were made to the coverage"4° of this pro-
134. See supra note 129. Further, the deduction should be restricted to meals with non-
business associates, except to the extent that meals with associates qualify for the de minimis
exclusion under I.R.C. § 132(e). See Wendy G. Shaller, Reforming the Business Meal Deduc-
tion: Matching Statutory Limitations with General Tax Policy, 24 DUQ. L. REV. 1129, 1149
(1986).
135. See supra notes 126, 129.
136. See 1990 CONF. REP., supra note 8, at 361.
137. This deduction applied to dependents who were physically or mentally incapacitated.
See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1954) [hereinafter 1954 S. REP.].
138. I.R.C. § 214 (1954). The provision allowed an itemized deduction for the costs of
caring for children under age twelve. No deduction was allowed for payments to the taxpayer's
dependents, and married taxpayers had to file a joint return to avail themselves of these bene-
fits. See 1954 S. REP., supra note 137, at 36; H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 30
(1954) [hereinafter 1954 H.R. REP.]. The woman had to be working or seeking employment,
and, if the caretaker also did household chores, such costs had to be prorated; however, if the
caretaker watched two children but only one was of eligible age for the deduction, no alloca-
tion was required. The $600 limit was applied regardless of how many eligible children the
taxpayer had. See 1954 S. REP., supra note 137, at 220.
Prior to the 1954 Code, childcare was viewed as a personal, nondeductible, expense. See,
e.g., Smith v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 1038 (1939), aff'dper curiam, 113 F.2d 114 (2d Cir.
1940).
139. For example, if the taxpayer's AGI was $4,700, which is $200 over the AGI limit of
$4,500, the taxpayer's deduction was limited to $400 ($600 - $200). 1954 S. REP., supra note
137, at 220.
140. In 1963, Congress made the deduction available to women who were deserted by their
husbands so long as their husbands' whereabouts were unknown and they had sought court-
ordered child support. These women were no longer subject to the requirements of filing joint
returns or to the upper income limitations. Act of April 2, 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-4, 77 Stat. 4




vision, the dollar amounts.4 of deductible expenses, and the income level," 2
indicating for which taxpayers this deduction was available.
The Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, sec. 212(a), 78 Stat. 19, 49, expanded the
applicability of the deduction to husbands whose wives were incapacitated or institutionalized.
It also extended coverage of the expenses to apply to children under the age of thirteen. See
1963 H.R. REP., supra note 83, at 52A; 1964 S. REP., supra note 83, at 68, 218; H.R. CONF.
REP. No. 1149, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1964).
In 1971, Congress amended this section to apply to all individuals who maintain a house-
hold for one or more "qualifying individuals." A "qualifying individual" was defined as the
taxpayer's dependent under the age of fifteen or an incapacitated dependent or spouse. Reve-
nue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, sec. 210(a), 85 Stat. 497, 518 (amending and renumber-
ing I.R.C. § 214(b)(1)). Moreover, the 1971 Act expanded coverage to include "substantially
full-time employees" (i.e., those working an average of at least three-fourth's time). See S.
REP. No. 437, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 62 (1971) [hereinafter 1971 S. REP.].
141. The Revenue Act of 1964, sec. 212(a), raised the dollar limit for expenses from $600
to $900 where the taxpayer had two or more dependents. There had been a Senate proposal
that the top level be raised to $1,000 where there were three or more dependents, but this
change was not adopted. See 1964 S. REP., supra note 83, at 3.
With the 1971 Act, the maximum deductible expenses increased to $200 per month for one
dependent, $300 for two dependents and $400 for three or more dependents. Revenue Act of
1971, sec. 210(a) (adding I.R.C. § 214(c)(2)(B) (repealed 1976)).
In addition, taxpayers were no longer required to allocate between household and childcare
expenses. See supra note 138. Rather, both types of expenses qualified under the definition of
"employment related expenses." 1971 Revenue Act, sec. 210(a) (adding I.R.C. § 214(b)(2)
(repealed 1976)). Besides reflecting a cost increase for actual childcare expenses, the increased
deduction was designed, in part, to cover these new expenses. See 1971 S. REP., supra note
140, at 60.
142. The 1964 Revenue Act, sec. 212(a), raised the AGI limit for the phase-out and elimi-
nation of the deduction to an AGI of $6,000. Initially, it had been proposed that the AGI
limit begin at $7,000 since, according to the U.S. Labor Department's statistics, the median
income of married couples where the wife worked outside the home was $7,050 in 1961. See
1964 S. REP., supra note 83, at 68. The $6,000 upper income limitation was applied to married
taxpayers and to husbands whose wives were incapacitated. Also, it applied to husbands
whose wives were institutionalized for the first ninety consecutive days. 1964 Revenue Act,
sec. 212(a) (amending I.R.C. § 214(b)(2) (repealed 1976)).
Further increases were made in 1971 by legislation raising the limit to an $18,000 AGI.
Revenue Act of 1971, sec. 210(a) (adding I.R.C. § 214(d) (repealed 1976)). For those taxpay-
ers with incomes above $18,000, the deduction was reduced fifty cents for each dollar the
taxpayer's AGI exceeded that amount. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 708, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 42
(1971) [hereinafter 1971 CONF. REP.]. For example, if the taxpayer's AGI is $24,000, subtract
$18,000 from $24,000 and divide the result by twenty-four (i.e., 2 X 12 months); the result is
$400, the amount by which the taxpayer's deduction had to be reduced because of this income
limitation. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.214A-2(c), 40 Fed. Reg. 20633-40 (1975). Congress
desired that the phase-out of the childcare deduction be less abrupt so that denial of the deduc-
tion, by a gradual elimination, would be made over a wider span of income levels. See 1971 S.
REP., supra note 140, at 60.
By 1971, all taxpayers were subject to the maximum income limitations. Previously, those
restrictions applied only to married taxpayers or to husbands with incapacitated wives. Id.
However, owing to the low level of income earned by women in those years, it is likely that
there were few single mothers whose income exceeded the maximum levels.
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With the Tax Reform Act of 1976,143 the deduction became a credit, 14 in
order to extend this tax benefit, previously limited to itemizers, to those tax-
payers using the standard deduction.' 45 At this time, Congress also elimi-
nated the income ceiling, because as a credit, its allowance had "minimal
revenue impact."' 146 Four years later, the 1981 tax legislation imposed a
sliding scale of applicable percentages based on income 1 7 in order to relieve
the burdens of the lower and middle class taxpayers, 148 but again failed to
Similarly, in 1975, the level was again raised to a $35,000 AGI. Tax Reduction Act of 1975,
Pub. L. No. 94-12, sec. 206, 89 Stat. 26, 32 (1975); see H.R. CONF. REP. No. 120, 94th Cong.,
Ist Sess., 59 (1975).
143. See Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, sec. 504(a)(1), 90 stat. 1520, 1563
(codified at I.R.C. § 44A (1976)).
144. The credit was equal to twenty percent of employment-related expenses. Those ex-
penses were subject to a dollar limitation of $2,000 for one qualifying individual and $4,000 for
two or more qualifying individuals, as well as an earned income limitation, which in the case of
spouses, was equal to the lower of their respective incomes. I.R.C. § 44A(a), (c)(1), (c)(2), (d),
(e) (1976). Married taxpayers had to file jointly to receive the credit. I.R.C. § 44A(f)(2)
(1976).
The 1978 tax legislation amended I.R.C. § 44A(f)(6) and allowed childcare payments to
related individuals, with the exception of either a dependent of the taxpayer or the taxpayer's
child under age nineteen. See Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, sec. 121(a), 92 Stat.
2767, 2779.
145. See 1976 S. REP., supra note 21, at 132. The credit also broadened the scope of the
benefit to include part-time workers. Id. at 133.
146. Id. at 132. Congress also reiterated that the childcare credit was "a cost of earning
income." Id.
147. The percentages applied against employment-related expenses vary from 20% to
30%, depending upon the taxpayer's income. The percentage is reduced by one percentage
point for every $1,000 by which the taxpayer's AGI exceeds $10,000. Recovery Economic Tax
Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, sec. 124(a), 95 Stat. 172, 197-98 (codified and renumbered at
I.R.C. § 21 (1988)). For example, if a taxpayer's AGI is $11,000, the applicable percentage
would be 29%, which would be multiplied by the taxpayer's employment-related expenses.
See H.R. REP. No. 201, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 57 (1981) [hereinafter 1981 H.R. REP.] The
example given in the House Report provided that a 40% maximum be reduced in such a case
to 39%, since as originally proposed, the sliding scale was to run between 30% and 40%. Id.
The dollar limitations on deductible employment-related expenses were raised to $2,400 for
one qualifying individual, and to $4,800 for two or more qualifying individuals. Economic
Recovery Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 97-34, sec. 124(b)(l)(A), (B), 95 Stat. 172, 198 (1981) (amend-
ing I.R.C. § 44A(d)). To constitute employment-related expenses, daycare centers have to
meet state law requirements. Id. sec. 124(d) (adding I.R.C. § 44A(c)(2)(C)).
148. 1981 H.R. REP., supra note 147, at 56; JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, GENERAL EXPLA-
NATION OF THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY TAX ACT OF 1981 53-54 (1981) [hereinafter 1981




recreate an income limit. 49 Since 1981, only minor changes have been made
to this section. "
0
B. Legislative History of the Dependent Care Program Exclusion
In 1981, the Economic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA)' 5' created a new exclu-
sion for employer-provided childcare which was administered under a writ-
ten, nondiscriminatory plan. 152 Because Congress was concerned that the
exclusion was more valuable than the credit, particularly to higher income
taxpayers, in 1986 it imposed a $5,000 limit on this tax benefit' 53 and, in
1988, it offset the allowable credit by the amount of exclusion taken.
5 4
149. Although the sliding scale has some relationship to income, it has little impact upon
taxpayers with incomes above $30,000, since a taxpayer with an income of $30,000 has the
same percentage limitation as a taxpayer with an income of $30,000,000. Because of the lack
of any real upper income limitation, there was also some objection to the fact that those tax-
payers with marginal incomes would have to pay for the childcare of the wealthy. 127 CONG.
REC. S8448 (daily ed. May 5, 1981) (statement of Sen. Biden).
150. This section was renumbered as I.R.C. § 21 and listed under the category of
"Nonrefundable Personal Credits." Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, sec.
471(c)(1), 98 stat. 494, 826.
In 1987, "overnight camp expenses" specifically were made ineligible for the credit, overrul-
ing Zoltan v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 490 (1982). The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1987, Pub. L. 100-203, sec. 10101, 101 Stat. 1330-382, 1330-384. Such expenses were consid-
ered personal in nature and not necessary expenses incurred in commuting to work. See H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 495, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 109, at 916 (1987); H.R. REP. NO. 391, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 1030 (1987); S. REP. No. 63, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 13 (1987).
In 1988, Congress revised the definition of a "qualifying individual" to be a dependent under
the age of thirteen rather than fifteen. Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, sec.
703(a), 102 Stat. 2343, 2426-27. Congress also required that the amount of credit available to
taxpayers first be reduced by the amounts excluded under I.R.C. § 129, the Dependent Assist-
ance Program Exclusion. Id. sec. 703(b); see infra notes 152-54 and explanation of the accom-
panying text.
151. Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (1981).
152. ERTA sec. 124(e) (codified at I.R.C. § 129 (1981)); see 1981 JOINT EXPLANATION,
supra note 148, at 53; S. CONF. REP. No. 176, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 201 (1981) [hereinafter
1981 CONF. REP.]. In order to qualify, Congress wanted to be sure that the plan did not
discriminate in favor of highly paid employees, officers or shareholders. ERTA sec. 124(e)
(codified at I.R.C. § 129(d)(2), (3) (1988)); see also H.R. REP. No. 794, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 5
(1982) (evaluating the technical amendments to the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981); S.
REP. No. 592, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1982) (discussing the technical amendments to the
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981).
153. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, sec. 121, 100 stat. 2085, 2109 (amend-
ing I.R.C. § 129(a)); 1985 H.R. REP., supra note 27, at 97; 1986 JOINT COMM. EXPLANATION,
supra note 27, at 818-19.
154. See supra note 150.
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C Unsuccessful Attempts to Phase Out Childcare Benefits
Until the childcare benefits deduction became a credit, an upper income
limitation on the availability of this tax benefit existed." 5 Reasoning that
there would be only a small impact on revenue, however, Congress elimi-
nated this cap." 6 Since that time there have been several unsuccessful at-
tempts to reimpose a ceiling upon the childcare benefits credit in order to
redirect the tax credit to the lower and middle classes and, ironically, to
provide a source of revenue. 157 Opponents of income limits argue that the
155. See supra notes 139-42 and accompanying text.
156. See supra note 148. Evidently, this "minimal revenue impact" has become more ap-
preciable since 1976. When the childcare phase-out legislation was introduced in 1989, the
ceiling was intended to produce approximately $1.5 billion in new revenue over a five year
period. See infra note 157.
157. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 4021, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); 137 CONG. REC. H11885,
Hi 1888 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991). Representative Thomas Petri (R-Wisc.) introduced a bill to
replace the childcare credit, among others, with a single earned income tax credit. Benefits
would be phased out at higher income levels and eliminated for taxpayers with AGIs of more
than $61,000. The goal of the legislation was to aid middle-income families. See Daily Tax
Rep. (BNA) No. 241, at H-1 (Dec. 16, 1991). Representative Mickey Edwards (R-Okla.)
introduced a bill to phase out both the dependent care credit and the dependent care assistance
program exclusion for taxpayers with incomes greater than $70,000, with a total elimination of
these benefits at incomes of $89,000 or more. See Edwards Amendment to H.R. 3, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess., 135 CONG. REc. H6662, H6665 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1989). This measure was
expected to raise more than $1.5 billion for taxable years 1991-1995. See JOINT COMM. ON
TAX'N, STAFF ESTIMATES OF BUDGET EFFECTS OF TITLE III OF H.R. 3, CHILDHOOD EDU-
CATION AND DEVELOPMENT ACT (JCX-9-90) (1990), reprinted in Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No.
64, at L-54 (Apr. 3, 1990); see also House Passes Childcare Bill, 89 TAx NoTs TODAY 204-4
(Oct. 6, 1989). The Edwards Amendment was passed by the House on March 29, 1990, but
this provision was deleted by the Senate. See SENATE FINANCE COMM., RESPONSE TO HOUSE
OFFER ON H.R. 3 28 (Aug. 3, 1990), reprinted in Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. d152, at L-37
(Aug. 7, 1990). Representative Clyde C. Holloway (R-La.), introduced the Toddler Tax
Credit for families with children under the age of five, which, if enacted, would be more gener-
ous than the current childcare credit for families with incomes of between $10,000 and
$30,000. Families with incomes between $30,000 and $50,000 would retain the current tax
credit, and those with incomes between $50,000 and $78,000 would have their credit phased
out, until it was completely eliminated for taxpayers with incomes over $78,000. Holloway-
Schulze Tax Credit Amendment to H.R. 3, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. H3582
(daily ed. July 12, 1989). Senator Pete Wilson (R-Cal.) introduced the Kids in Day-Care Serv-
ices Act of 1988, which intended to limit the childcare benefits to "American families who are
in the most need" by imposing a phase-out for AGIs of more than $65,000, with the elimina-
tion of benefits for families with an AGI of more than $93,000. 134 CONG. REC. S 11464,
S11465 (daily ed. Aug. 10, 1988). Senator Bill Bradley (D-N.J.) in 1988 made a counterpro-
posal to phase out business meals and entertainment expenses for upper income taxpayers in
order to finance the rest of the childcare legislation. See 134 CONG. REC. S7933, 57958 (daily
ed. June 16, 1988). The Senate accepted the substitute. See 88 TAX NOTES TODAY 160-2
(Aug. 4, 1988). Both proposals, however, were dropped by the Senate. See 88 TAX NOTES
TODAY 163-H (Aug. 9, 1988).
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childcare industry would be hurt;"'8 that employers would eliminate their
dependent care assistance programs, resulting in adverse effects upon lower
and middle class families;159 that childcare is a cost of earning income for all
families regardless of income; e ° that the credit alleviates some of the penal-
ties associated with two-income married couples; 6 ' that no other employ-
ment-related expenses are subject to a phase-out; 62 and that imposing a
ceiling would create administrative problems for employers.' 63 Proponents
of a ceiling, on the other hand, consider the income limitations as fostering
greater tax equity and providing additional revenue to serve lower income
taxpayers' childcare needs.' 64
158. See Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 188, at GI (Sept. 27, 1990) (statement of Mark
Wincek, an attorney with the D.C. law firm of Kilpatrick and Cody, on behalf of Employers
Coalition on Childcare) [hereinafter Wincek].
159. Because participation would fall, there would be little justification for administering a
Dependent Care Assistance Program. See Wincek, supra note 158. The ceiling would elimi-
nate the "carrot" to stimulate employers to administer such programs, since the bill would
eliminate the exclusion for corporate executives. See Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 95, at G-7
(May 16, 1990) (statement of Ken Feltman, Employers' Council on Flexible Compensation).
According to a survey of ninety-three employers who were contacted by the Employers' Coun-.
cil on Flexible Compensation, approximately one-half of the companies said they would cancel
their exclusion program if H.R. 3 passed. Id. According to a survey of workers conducted by
the Voucher Corporation, fifty-six percent of employees currently using flexible spending ac-
counts would be affected by the bill. See Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 188, at G-1 (Sep. 27,
1990) (statement of Ken Feltman, Employers' Council on Flexible Compensation). The phase-
out would detract from the appeal of flexible benefit programs. Id. (statement of Helena Peter-
son, Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company).
160. See 2 1984 TREASURY PLAN, supra note 1, at 18.
161. According to the Employers' Council on Flexible Compensation, the credit eliminates
the "marriage penalty." Yet, such an analysis erroneously equates married couples having
children of eligible age with all other married couples. See Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 188, at
Gl (Sept. 27, 1990) (Statement of Helen Blank, Children's Legal Defense Fund); see generally
Wendy C. Gerzog, The Marriage Penalty: The Working Couple's Dilemma, 47 FORDHAM L.
REV. 27 (1978) (discussing the marriage penalty).
In addition, specific legislation to deal with two-earner married couples was enacted in 1981.
See Economic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA) of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, sec. 103(a), 95 Stat. 172,
187 (codified at I.R.C. § 221 (1988)). ERTA was repealed by the Tax Reform Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-514, sec. 131(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2113, but had provided for a deduction of up
to $3,000 as an adjustment to income. In enacting this legislation, Congress viewed the mar-
riage penalty as "undermin[ing respect for the family ... and for the tax system itself." S.
REP. No. 97-144, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1981).
162. Reclaiming the Tax Code for American Families, 1991: Hearing Before the House
Select Comm. on Children, Youth, and Families, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 86 (1991) (statement of
Nancy Duff Campbell, National Women's Law Center), reprinted in 91 TAx NOTES TODAY
83-34 (Apr. 16, 1991) [hereinafter Campbell]; see also 134 CONG. REC. 57933, S7959 (daily ed.
June 16, 1988) (statement of Sen. Bradley).
163. Employers would be uncertain as to an employee's eligibility based on family income.
See Wincek, supra note 158.
164. See, e.g., Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 95, at G-7 (May 16, 1990) (statement of Rebecca
Tice, Legislative Director for Rep. Stenholm, D-Tex.).
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D. A Proposal
This Article suggests replacing the current dependent care statute with a
refundable credit'6 5 that is indexed for inflation 166 and has a gradual phase-
out 67 and elimination at upper income levels. In addition, the current ex-
clusion for Dependent Care Assistance Programs should be repealed, since
the exclusion mainly benefits the higher income brackets. 168 Returning to an
income ceiling would complement the statute's original function of enabling
average-income taxpayers to work. 169  In addition, it would finance those
additional changes that would increase childcare benefits for those who truly
need these costs subsidized.' 7 °
165. Many legislators and commentators have urged the benefit of making the childcare
credit refundable in an effort to aid lower income working parents. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 196,
101st Cong., 1st Sess. 404 (1989) [hereinafter 1989 S. REP.]. The Senate more recently ap-
proved an amendment to legislation which was dropped from the Conference agreement, pro-
posing to make the credit 90% refundable for taxpayers with an AGI less than $28,000. 1990
CONF. REP., supra note 8, at 21. The purpose of such refundable credit is to "remove an
important barrier to the economic advancement of low-income families in that adequate child-
care while parents work will now be more affordable." 1989 S. REP., supra, at 404; see ABA
Task Force, reprinted in 89 TAX NOTES TODAY 205-07 (Oct. 10, 1989) [hereinafter ABA
Report]; Campbell, supra note 162.
The refundable feature should allow for advance payments to be made throughout the year
so that the taxpayer will not have to wait to receive a refund until after he has filed for the
taxable year. See ABA Report, supra, at 205-07; Campbell, supra note 162; President Bush's
Proposed Child Care TC Legislation 1989, reprinted in Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 50, at L-I
(Mar. 16, 1989) (submitted to Congress March 15, 1989).
166. See Campbell, supra note 162; ABA Report, supra note 165, at 205-07. Further ad-
justments could be made to reflect the added costs for larger families. See ABA Report, supra
note 165, at 205-07 (recommending an additional tier of employment-related dollar expense
limitations for three or more eligible children).
167. The need for a less abrupt denial of this tax benefit led to some of the revisions made
in the 1971 Act. See supra note 142. Certainly, with inflation, such a gradual phase-out is
even more necessary in the 1990s. The phase-out should resemble the recent phase-outs in
personal exemptions and itemized deductions. See supra notes 8, 9; infra part VII.
168. A further reason to eliminate the exclusion is that it is likely that since executives have
been eliminated as beneficiaries, fewer employers will want to administer these programs. See
supra note 159. It should be noted, however, that currently only 3-7% of employees partici-
pate in these exclusion plans, as opposed to 18-22% participation in health benefit exclusion
plans. By contrast, the average contribution is between $2,000 and $2,696 per employee (com-
pared to between $488 to $608 for such health plans). See 1992 GAO Report Summary, supra
note 101, at 76-16. Moreover, without an exclusion there would be no administrative problems
such as those outlined, supra note 162.
The I.R.C. § 129 exclusion benefits those taxpayers at income brackets higher than the
credit equivalent, currently 20%. The childcare credit saves more in taxes than the exclusion
for lower bracket taxpayers; therefore, it is untrue that eliminating this provision would greatly
hurt the lower and middle classes. See supra note 159.
169. See supra notes 138-42 and accompanying text.
170. See supra 164-66 and accompanying text. The $100,000 threshold amount set forth in
I.R.C. § 68 is a politically acceptable level to begin the phase-out, yet even at this amount over
$100 million could be restored to the government or used to fund other features of a childcare
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While childcare expenses reflect a cost of earning taxable income, they are
also personal and family expenses.' 1  To those critics who foresee irrepara-
ble harm to the childcare industry, 172 it is unclear whether the childcare
industry, and which part therein, would be hurt by an income ceiling, be-
cause wealthier taxpayers are more likely to use in-home childcare and
housekeeping than outside-the-home daycare facilities and are also more
likely to continue to work without this tax benefit.'1 3 For those who view
the childcare credit as compensation for the marriage penalty, it should be
understood that the childcare credit only aids those two-income married
couples with children under the age of thirteen and thus cannot adequately
address the problems associated with the marriage penalty. 174 By contrast,
because of the lack of an income ceiling, low and moderate income families
are subsidizing the childcare of 280,000 families earning over $100,000 a
year, according to 1990 data. 175 In fact, the lower and middle classes effec-
tively pay for the childcare expenses of millionaires,' 76 and therefore the
rationale of the provision, to enable taxpayers to work, has been lost.
Because the phase-out would apply to many mixed personal/business de-
ductions, 177 it would not be the only quasi business-motivated expense elimi-
nated for the wealthy. 178 Finally, since this phase-out would parallel the
phase-outs for personal exemptions and itemized deductions enacted by the
credit that would benefit lower and middle class families. See JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, DIS-
TRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF CERTAIN TAX PROVISIONS OF H.R. 3 AS PASSED BY THE HOUSE,
(JCX-14-90) (May 18, 1990), reprinted in 90 TAX NOTES TODAY (May 21, 1990) [hereinafter
DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS]; see also infra note 183.
171. Thus, although these expenses can be considered a cost of earning income at all in-
come levels, childcare may well be restricted like all other personal costs because it represents
personal and family choices. While to some degree the dollar limitations which are placed on
"employment-related expenses" address these concerns, see 2 1984 TREASURY PLAN, supra
note 1, at 18, they do not go far enough to explain the purpose of having lower and middle
income taxpayers subsidizing the childcare expenses of the wealthy.
172. See supra note 158.
173. In-home childcare is usually more expensive than outside-the-home care. See Robert
J. Klein, Finding Live-In Help for Your Child That is Loving, Loyal and Also Legal, MONEY,
Sept. 1989, at 155.
174. See supra note 161.
175. See DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS, supra note 170.
176. For example, in 1985, 307 millionaires claimed the childcare credit. While objectively
not a large number, there is something egregiously wrong about this subsidy for the rich "to
enable them to work." See I.R.S., PUB. No. 1304, INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS 1985,
RETURNS FILED, SOURCES OF INCOME, EXEMPTIONS, ITEMIZED DEDUCTIONS, AND TAX
COMPUTATIONS 31 (1988).
177. This Article advocates similar income ceilings for the moving expense deduction and
for certain presently excluded fringe benefits. See supra parts III & IV.
178. See supra note 162.
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1990 legislation, 79 it is a consistent way to restore progressivity into the tax
system.
VII. PHASE-OUT AT UPPER INCOME LEVELS
As Congressman Dan Rostenkowski remarked, "I am on record endors-
ing a higher top tax rate. The principle of simplicity is severely com-
promised by the deduction limits and exemption phaseouts concocted to
maintain the fiction of the 31 percent top tax rate."' 80 This Article likewise
suggests imposing progressivity through higher tax brackets for the wealthy.
In addition, many of these mixed personal/business deductions should be
eliminated entirely, regardless of whether brackets are added to the rate
structure, since the abuse inherent in deducting the personal element of these
items creates gross inequities in the tax system. As long as the public prefers
the "fiction of the 31 percent top tax rate," the phase-out of personal and
mixed personal/business deductions seems necessary.
This Article therefore recommends that the moving expense deduction,
the exclusions for no-additional-cost services, qualified employee discounts,
and qualified tuition reductions, the deductions for business meals and en-
tertainment, and the childcare credit be phased out and eliminated at upper
income levels. Paralleling the phase-outs for personal deductions, the dimi-
nution of mixed personal/business expense benefits should: (1) begin at ad-
justed gross incomes of $100,000, the applicable amount for imposition of
the I.R.C. section 68 floor on personal itemized deductions,' 8 ' (2) be elimi-
nated at $150,000, the threshold amount for the phase-out of personal ex-
emptions under I.R.C. section 151(d),' s2 and (3) be indexed for inflation.
Clearly, imposing such phase-outs will produce much needed tax revenue
to support measures for the lower and middle classes. In 1991, for example,
an estimated $146,000,000 in revenue were lost because taxpayers with in-
comes over $100,000 were able to claim the childcare credit. 8 3 Similarly,
and even more remarkably, in 1988, the proposed phase-out and elimination
of the entertainment and meal deduction for taxpayers with adjusted gross
179. See supra notes 8, 9; infra part VII.
180. 1990 Rostenkowski Statement, supra note 10.
181. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
182. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. Obviously, a phase-out could begin at
higher income levels, similar to the I.R.C. § 151(d) phase-out which begins at $150,000 and
has a very gradual phase-out, but such a phase-out would produce less revenue. Since the
overall objectives of restoring some progressivity into the tax system and eliminating some of
the abuses associated with mixed personal/business deductions would still be served, these
alternatives, perhaps more politically acceptable, should be considered.
183. JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL
YEARS 1992-1996 18 (JCS-4-91) (Joint Comm. Print Mar. 11, 1991).
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incomes over $360,000 was expected to raise $800,000,000 in new
revenue. 1 84
VIII. CONCLUSION
In light of the fact that mixed personal/business deductions produce ineq-
uities, that the current tax system sorely needs more progressivity, and that
the budget deficit has reached astronomical levels, reforms are necessary.
Congress should amend the home office deduction statute to provide that
only expenses from a home office in which the taxpayer actually meets or
deals with his clients or customers, or which is the taxpayer's sole office, be
deductible.'8 5 By limiting the home office deduction in this manner, Con-
gress would consequently restrict the deduction allowed for certain commut-
ing expenses. Congress should further eliminate the parking exclusion, or, at
the very least, subject that exclusion to nondiscrimination requirements so
that tax-free parking must be available to a broad spectrum of employees,
instead of allowing the exclusion to apply to only higher paid executives as is
the current law. Moreover, Congress should re-focus the moving expense
deduction to aid those taxpayers for whom moving to take a new job at a
new job location would create the greatest burden. The new deduction
should be an "above the line" adjustment to income, adjusted in limits to
reflect current costs and phased out for upper bracket taxpayers. Congress
should move away from the inequities among employees of certain industries
created by the 1984 fringe benefit legislation by imposing income limits on
their excludibility. In addition, a great deal of revenue could be raised by
imposing income caps on deductible meal and entertainment expenses,
thereby increasing the public's confidence in the fairness of the tax system.
There has been resistance to the phase-out of the childcare credit for high
income taxpayers. If such a phase-out is coordinated with income phase-
outs of other mixed personal/business expenses, it may be more politically
acceptable. Regardless of whether Congress ultimately is successful in en-
acting additional tax brackets, it is clear that many mixed personal/business
deductions need to be curtailed or eliminated.
184. 134 CONG. REC. S7933, S7962 (daily id. June 16, 1988) (statement of Sen. Bradley).
The huge figure led Senator Bradley to remark, "[s]urprising is it not, that people who earn
over $440,000 a year have that many lunches?" Id. Although the deduction is phased out
beginning at an AGI of $360,000, it is not eliminated until an AGI of over $440,000. Id. at
S7959.
185. The third exception, relating to a separate structure which is not attached to the
dwelling unit, should also be retained since it is more likely to be based on business exigencies
and less often on an area of abuse.
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